Detection of Replay Attack in Control Systems

Using Multi-Sine Watermarking by Ghamarilangroudi, Azam







Electrical & Computer Engineering
Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
for the Degree of




c© Azam Ghamarilangroudi, 2020
CONCORDIA UNIVERSITY
School of Graduate Studies
This is to certify that the thesis prepared
By: Azam Ghamarilangroudi
Entitled: Detection of Replay Attack in Control Systems Using Multi-Sine
Watermarking
and submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Applied Science (Electrical & Computer Engineering)
complies with the regulations of this University and meets the accepted standards with respect to
originality and quality.












Dr Yousef R. Shayan, Chair
Department of Electrical & Computer Engineering
3/27/2020
Dr Amir Asif, Dean
Faculty of Engineering and Computer Science
Abstract
Detection of Replay Attack in Control Systems Using Multi-Sine Watermarking
Azam Ghamarilangroudi
Cyber-physical systems (CPSs) consist of networks of sensors, computers and actuators. This
research studies a control system within a CPS in which the plant and controller are separated
geographically but connected through communication links. The links could be subject to security
attacks. Recently, the research focus on attack detection has been growing rapidly. This thesis
aims to develop methods based on the dynamic models of CPS for detecting attacks.
This research focuses on detection of ”replay attacks”. First, it proposes a watermarking
scheme based on injecting a sequence of multi-sine waves. The watermarking is designed in such
a way that the transient response to watermarking is suppressed. A design process is proposed to
reach a compromise between (i) the ease of detection of watermarking effects in the output and (ii)
the limiting of output fluctuations due to watermarking (and loss of control quality). One of the
benefits of this method is that it only requires frequency response of the closed loop system at a set
of frequencies; a model of system is not required.
Power spectral density estimates based on periodograms of the plant output (received by the
controller) are used to trace watermarking. Furthermore, replay attack detection by tracing water-
marking effects in the residual of Kalman filters is also explored.
A case study involving a laboratory water tank is used to explore the proposed method. The
results of linear and non-linear model simulations are presented and is shown that replay attacks
can be detected successfully.
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A Cyber Physical System (CPS) integrates physical processes, computational and control re-
sources, and communication capabilities. CPS is widely used in modern society, becoming fre-
quent in many domains, including energy production, health care, telecommunications, power
generation, water and gas distribution networks, smart cities, smart buildings, smart grids, biomed-
ical engineering, medical devices, autonomous vehicles and transportation systems. Some of the
expected qualities of CPSs, to name a few, are autonomy, reliability, security and efficiency.
Autonomy refers to designing control rules, for example in a centralized, decentralized or dis-
tributed system in a way that the system works properly. One of the usages of reliability is that
how a rule/standard for the whole system is defined in which the system works functionally, with-
out any critical failure, besides all of the individual standards of each system. Security means that
the communications are safe and can be trusted, and efficiency means that how a system/controller
is designed in order to minimize the cost function in system while achieving the desired function-
ally. Also CPS is relates to the Internet of Things (IOT), as IOT forms a foundation for the CPS
revolution. CPS is driving the biggest shift in business and technology since World War II. CPSs
are physical and engineered systems whose operations are monitored, coordinated, controlled and
integrated by a computing and communication core. Just as the internet transformed how humans
interact with one another, CPS will transform how we interact with the physical world around us.
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There are three important topics in CPS: confidentiality, integrity and availability (known as
CIA [4]). Confidentiality in CPS means that we can rely on the input and output of the system
and we prevent any adversary (attack) to penetrate the system to read data. Integrity means pre-
venting any attack attempts to inject any data to input and output of system, and availability means
that we always have communication between controller and plant. If integrity fails, it means that
an attacker can prevent the data from reaching the plant or controller or it can inject an attack. CPS
requires improved tools which enable us to design methodology that supports: 1) specification,
modeling and analysis of continuous and discrete models or models of computation, as well as
networking, interoperability and time synchronization; 2) scalability and complexity management
through interfacing with a synthesis of systems; 3) validation and verification of stochastic models,
as well as simulation and certification.
In this part, some definitions of attack are introduced [2].
Replay Attack: In this type of attack, the attacker reads the information of input and output of the
system that respectively comes from and goes to the controller, without knowing any information
of the system. It manipulates the input and output in a way that it adds a signal u to the control
signal (e.g. a multiple of it) and it repeats the output, as controller does not notice any difference
in the output of the system.
Covert Attack: In this type of attack, the attacker knows all of the information of the system, reads
the input and output data to/from the system, and can inject an input to the system and reciprocally
to the output of the system which neutralizes the effect of added input. In this way the controller
does not recognize the existence of attack.
Zero Dynamic Attack: In this type of attack, the attacker knows complete knowledge of system
plus the initial condition of states, and does not need to read the input and output of the system,
and just injects an attack as input on actuator channel in the same frequency of the right-half pole
of the non-minimum phase system, which makes system unstable.
Bias injection Attack: In this type of attack, the attacker knows the model of the plant, but it
does not need to read the information of input and output of system. The attacker adds a bias in
2
output and also adds a bias to state (x) as states and output (y) in a way that nothing will appear in
detection filter. The need for detection of attacks has been growing significantly, especially due to
many existing ways of hacking the systems. In the next section, we review some research done on
this subject.
1.1 Literature Review
1.1.1 Classification of Attacks
Different authors propose different methods of attacks while the method of detecting the attacks
are also presented in the same paper. For instance in [1], the authors have introduced different types
of attack and also Pasqualetti in [2], beside introducing various types of attack, has introduced the
methods of detecting and identifying the attacks. We will explore some of these results in the next
section along with attack detection. In this part, we mention that different authors may use different
definitions of attack. For example, Teixeira et al. in [1] have defined replay attack as an attack that
repeats the recorded data in output, but Pasqualetti et al. in [2] have defined replay attack as an
attack which injects some signal u in input and with injecting some output that subtracts from
output of the system leading to the same output as it was recorded, and stated that the difference
with covert attack is that the covert attack is closed loop while the replay attack is open loop.
1.1.2 Detection of Attack
The analysis of vulnerabilities of CPS to external attacks has received increasing attention in
the past 10 years. Concerns about security and safety of control systems is not new, as various
papers have dealt with system fault detection, isolation and recovery. CPS, however, suffers from
specific vulnerabilities which do not have impact on output and classical control system, but affect
the boundedness of states in a way that it makes the system unbounded for which appropriate
detection and identification techniques are needed to be developed [2, 3]. Different papers study
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different attacks and define them [5, 6, 7]. Some papers propose the method of coding for detecting
attack [8, 9]. In [9] a method of putting a decoder inside sensor is suggested which properly
works in a special condition. Also in some papers such as [9], it is argued that if we give attacker
sufficient time, it can estimate the encoder matrix, so he can inject the attack properly such that
we cannot detect. In confrontation of attacker and defender, what is important is which one has
more information than the other one, and this may determine the winner. Some papers propose
the method of injecting an Independent and Identically Distributed (IID) control signal u∗ to plant
input u which increases the cost function, but increases the ability to detect attack. The goal is to
solve the optimization problem of minimizing the cost function versus maximizing the covariance
of attack for different attacks such as replay attack and false data injection attack [10, 11, 12, 13].
In [11] it is shown that the probability of detection of attack changes based on the number of inputs
which attacker can read; if the attacker can read the data (input) to which watermarking method is
applied to, the probability of attack detection decreases as much as it will be equal to false alarm
rate. Compared to [10] in which attack can be better detected when watermarking technique is
applied, the authors of [11] study the case that attacker can read the input which defender applies
the watermarking method.
Some papers illustrate that the persistent excitation condition is used to reach the goal of system
identification; for example Wu et al. in [14] discuss pulse compression method in process moni-
toring. The results show that compared to the case of with no probing signal, the output achieves
high resolution, high signal to noise ratio monitoring, and the acquired data can be used for online
diagnosis. Yilin Mo in [13], [12] and Weerkkody et al. in [11] have investigated the use of an IID
signal, and have showed that detecting the attack will be easier. The most common probing signals
for power systems are a rectangular pulse or square wave, periodic waveform, sustained sinusoidal
signals, and sustained noise signals [15]. For instance, Hauer in [15] has used square waves to
probe specific oscillatory modes. In [16], the author has used a method for generating the cosine
wave probing signal and have showed that using that cosine signal helps to identify the system and
has compared results theoretically to another case when an IID signal is used as probing signal.
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Pierre in [16] has discussed the use of the sum of many very low amplitude sinusoidal waves i.e.
multi-sine signals. Briefly, the advantages of using such a signal compared to an IID is: firstly, we
have complete control over the frequency content of the signal, and we can choose the frequencies
for sine waves in the frequency band of interest; secondly, it does not make sharp transitions com-
pared to an IID signal; thirdly, we need to identify system continuously with specific frequency
and amplitude which is the specification of a sine wave, not an IID signal. It has also some dis-
advantages such as using a periodic signal like multi-sine signal excites only specific frequencies,
while a non-periodic signal excites a continuous range of frequencies. So, a key for an IID signal
is to excite a large number of frequencies covering the frequency band of interest. Pierre et al. in
[16] proposed a way to design a good multi-sine signal in a way that the amount of Signal to Noise
Ratio (SNR) for a low-level probing signal is more than other cases, and they have used multi-sine
signals for system identification. In [17] Hauer et al. have applied sine wave, square wave and
pseudo random signal as probing signals and have compared the results with each other. In [18]
the authors have used pseudo random noise and single-mode square wave (SMSW) and at the end,
they have compared the results for mid-level signal with low-level signal. In [19], the author has
used a persistent excitation signal for regulation/tracking problem.
Morrow et al. in [20] has studied the use of a probing signal such as an IID signal to detect
replay attack. The system is from Distributed Flexible AC Transmission System (D-FACTS). In
[21] the author have studied also the sub optimal technique with stochastic game approach. In [22]
the author has declared that using a dynamic detector, the number of measurements needed for
detection of attack is lower than the number of measurements with static detector. [23] declares
that if the system does not know the initial state and the attacker knows, the attacker can damage
the system while being stealthy. The zero state inducing attack is also proposed, and it happens
when the attacker does not change the system sensor output. It is always stealthy. Some papers
such as [24] have studied smart sensors which can send innovation signals, residuals, instead of
output to the controller. In this way the attacker can read the residual and make an attack signal
with linear change in real residual. Here mean and covariance of the attack signal is the same as
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the innovated signal produced by a smart sensor. Because there is a false data detector in controller
side (which detects attack based on the residual), and the statistical specifications of attacker signal
is the same as innovation signal, the detector cannot detect the attack while the attack can be
designed in a way that the covariance of the error in remote estimator will increase much more
than the case that we do not have any attack. In this way, the attacker can harm the system without
the defender realizing it. In [25, 26], producing randomly A,B,C,D of system with fast speed (a
seed) and replacing A,B,C,D of system every step, and making the system consistent, when the
matrices of the controller and detector change, prevents any attack that needs the model of the
system; therefore, attack cannot read and guess the system dynamic as fast as the dynamic of the
system is changing. As a result, if the attacker enters the system, it will not succeed. Meanwhile,
some papers deal with Denial of Service (DOS) attack. Krotofil et al. [27] have studied the effect
of DOS attack that depending on the time it is applied, it can have the worst effect. The paper
[28] is based on the nonlinearity specification: in a non-linear system the effect of injecting two
inputs in the output of system is not equal to sum of the output effects of each input. Loosely
speaking in [29, 30, 31, 32], the authors completely and comprehensively study the subject of
CPS and different existing methods that are available for detecting the attacks. Table 1.1 they
are categorized. For instance, in power grid context, Liu et al. [33] has investigated false data
injection attacks by inserting arbitrary errors into sensor measurements. The authors analyzed two
attack outlines in which the attacker is either constrained to some specific meters or limited in the
resources required to compromise meters. For each scenario, algebraic conditions are derived to
validate the existence of stealthy attach vectors, which do not make any change to the residue.
In the same field, Sandberg et al. [34] have represented numerous security measure methods
that model the least attempt needed by an attacker to inject false data to Supervisory Control and
Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems. To design such a method, the authors have explored the
physical topology of the power network, provided situational awareness to the system operator in
an effort to interpret data manipulation. Pasqualetti et al. [35] have analyzed attacks on sensors
and actuators by considering a generic continuous time control system. The authors have defined
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special conditions that provided the probability of detecting such attacks, given a set of known
susceptibilities. In [36], Irita et al. propose a detecting method by adding a white Gaussian noise
as a code signal to both sensor output and also control output (input of plant), and replay attack can
be detected using fault diagnosis matrices even if the code signal is decrypted. This paper proposes
a robust detection system created by introducing a replay attack detection method that sacrifices
control performance to code signal. The authors have proposed a bargaining game which has
agreed on control input noise and considers control performance and detection precision. Based
on sensor output and state estimated values, fault diagnosis matrices for detecting replay attack are
used.
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Table 1.1: A brief taxonomy of CPS approaches from a control-theoretic perspective [29]
Type of System Noise Attack Models Detect Mechanism Reference
Power grid ! false data injec-
tion on sensors
Residue detector [33, 34]












Residue detector [38, 39]






- State attacks Output estimator [40]
Distributed Net-
work

















Mo et al. in [38] have considered a data injection attack on a noisy wireless sensor network.
The attack is modeled as a constrained optimal control problem in which the Kalman filter is used
to perform state estimation, while a failure detector is employed to detect anomalies in the system.
Similarly, Mo et al. in [39] have considered attacks on control systems in a noisy environment.
The adversary in this system is aware of the plant model, noise statistics, the controller and state
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estimator. The attacker can also manipulate a set of sensors. Necessary and sufficient conditions
are derived for the feasibility of a dynamic false-data injection attack where an attacker can cause
unbounded errors in the state estimate without substantially increasing the probability of detection
by a residue detector. Additionally, an algorithm to perform such an attack is derived. This method
involves rendering unstable modes in the unobservable system. Using redundant sensors to mea-
sure unstable modes is suggested as a method to improve resilience to such an attack. Pajic et al.
[40] have analyzed the impact of malicious nodes in the context of a wireless control network. The
authors have designed and assessed the effectiveness of a detector based on an approach that aims
at estimating sensor outputs. In a similar work addressing attacks on system states, Sundaram et al.
[41] have proposed a combinatorial procedure to compute the initial state of a distributed control
system to infer such attacks. Pasqualetti in [42] also has characterized the effect of unidentifiable
inputs on the consensus value and has proposed three failure-sensitive filters to detect and identify
malicious or faulty nodes. Verrelli et al. in [19] have studied and considered persistent excitation
condition on a regulation/tracking problem of a rotor position. In [43], the authors have studied
different attacks including DOS, replay and deception attack, and the methods of detecting the
attacks such as Bayesian detection with binary hypothesis, weighted least square method, χ2 de-
tector based on Kalman filter, and Quasi-FDI (Fault Detection and Isolation technique). Bayesian
detection with binary hypothesis is widely applied in the data fusion of sensor networks since it is
easy to formulate.
1.1.3 Attack Accommodation
Fawzi et al. [37] has focused on the design, implementation, analysis and characterization of
robust estimation and control in CPS when they are affected by corrupted sensors and actuators.
He has mentioned that if more than half of the sensors are attacked, it is impossible to accurately
reconstruct the state of the system. Yuan et al. [44] has designed a security resilient controller for
CPSs under Denial-of-Service (DOS) attack. In fact a coupled design framework incorporates the
cyber configuration policy of Intrusion Detection System (IDS) and robust control of dynamical
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system. Yuan et al. designed algorithms based on value iteration methods and Linear Matrix
Inequalities (LMI) for computing the optimal cyber security policy and control laws. Lucia et al.
[45] have proposed a method of designing a sequence of N robust one-step controllable set and
then by designing a state feedback or output feedback controller, they have proposed a supervisor
above the system which by checking the pre-check and post-check data in each step and comparing
to the amount that should be in the zone, is able to detect attack and find the minimum cost function
of system. In [44], Yuan et al. have studied DOS attack also. They proposed a resilient controller
against this attack while the performance of the system remains in an acceptable level based on an
LMI algorithm and H 8 . Rebai in [46] has proposed an event-based implementation in order to
archive novel security strategy. By solving a sufficient Bilinear Matrix Inequality (BMI) condition,
controller gain is deduced. Li et al. in [47] using the method LMI has controlled the system which
is under fault/attack.
1.1.4 Transient Response Suppression
In [49] the authors have studied how to drive a transducer in such a way to produce a steady-
state tone burst. By beginning and ending at zero crossings of the sine, i.e. the usual turn on,
turn off, transient is suppressed. The goal is to produce sound radiation in the surrounding fluid
medium without any transient response using a transient suppressed drive.
1.2 Thesis Objectives and Contributions
Watermarking is one of the methods for detection of replay attacks. In literature, random IID
signals are proposed for watermarking.
This thesis proposes a watermarking approach using sine waves. The main advantage of this
approach is that it only requires the value of frequency response of the system at a finite set of
frequencies used in watermarking. This information can be obtained experimentally and a mathe-
matical model of plant is not required.
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To enhance effecting of the method, the frequency of sine waves are changed from time to time.
The thesis also propose a method of choosing the watermarking signal to suppress the transient
response from applying the sequence of sine waves. Sine waves are smooth and do not increase
the actuator wear. Furthermore, the output fluctuations resulting from watermarking can be easily
adjusted in the proposed design process.
A case study involving a laboratory tank is used to study the application of the proposed
method.
1.3 Thesis Outline
In Chapter 2, different attacks, models and mathematics formula, main concepts and definitions
used in this thesis are presented. In Chapter 3, replay attack detection via injecting sine wave
instead of an IID signal is described. A method for suppressing the transient part of the output of
a system resulting from sine wave is presented and attack detection via periodogram is proposed.
In Chapter 4, a case study involving a laboratory tank system is presented and models are used
and replay attack detection using watermarking, periodogram and Kalman filter is studied. Finally,




In this chapter we define every attack to some extent in detail. Before that, we review some
definitions:
2.1 Definition of Attacks
In this section, we study some definitions about attack.
Disclosure Resources: When the attacker can read information from either U (actuator channel)
or Y (sensor channel), it is said that they are disclosure resources.
Disruptive Resources: When the attacker can inject data on channel or modify the availability of
channels.
Confidentiality refers to disclosure resources while integrity and availability refers to disruptive
resources.





where x :∈ Rn and A ∈ Rn×n, B ∈ Rn×m, C ∈ Rp×n, and D ∈ Rp×m. If we assume discrete u
and y as uk and yk, this attack modifies the control signal uk and output yk to corrupted signals u˜k
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and y˜k, the deception attack can be modeled as:
u˜k =uk + Γ
ubuk
y˜k =yk + Γ
ubuk
(2.2)
Where buk ∈ R|Ru1 | , byk ∈ R|R
y
1 | and Γu ∈ Bnu×|Ru1 | and Γy ∈ Bny×|Ry1 | , B := {0, 1} are binary
matrices mapping the data corruption to respective channels [1]. One model of data deception
resource attack is bias data injection which is described as following:
Physical Resources: Physical attacks may occur in control systems, Physical attacks are very
similar to fault signals as we have the system (2.3)

xk+1 = Axk +Bu˜k +Gwk + Ffk
yk = Cxk
(2.3)
where wk is disturbance and fk is fault. Now if we want to specify a physical attack, F is the attack
signature and fk is the attack signal.
Teixeira et al. in [1], have represented the model of attack based on Fig. 2.1.
Figure 2.1: Model of attack [1]
The adversary model considered in this paper is illustrated in Fig. 2.1 and is composed of
an attack policy and the adversary resources i.e., the system model knowledge, the disclosure
resources, and the disruption resources. K = {Pˆ , Fˆ , Dˆ} is a primary model knowledge possessed
by the adversary; lk corresponds to the set of sensor and actuator data available to the adversary at
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time k as represented in Eq. (2.4), thus being mapped to the disclosure resources; ak is the attack
vector at time k that may affect the system behavior using the disruption resources addressed by
B. The attack policy mapping K and lk to ak at time k is denoted as ak = g(K, lk).
2.1.1 Replay Attack
Reply attack can reset the measurements to reflect the prerecorded nominal operating condition
and to hide the effect of state attack on the system dynamics. Reply attack can access all sensors
without knowing the dynamic of system. Pasqualetti et al. [2, 3] have described the replay attack
as follows:
Figure 2.2: Replay attack [2]
As Fig. 2.2 shows, replay attack can be modeled as input (Bu,−Cx+Cx˜) when x is the state
under attack and x˜ is the state without attack respectively. While in [1] it is described as follows.














where lk is the control and measurement data sequence gathered by the adversary from time k0 to
kr (duration of disclosure resources) and lk0 = 0 and ru ∈ Rnu×nu and ry ∈ Rny×ny are the binary
incidence matrices mapping the data channels to the corresponding data gathered by adversary.
This type of attack does not affect the physical dynamic of system. Disclosure resource is depicted
in Fig. 2.3.
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Figure 2.3: Phase I of replay attack [1]
Eq. (2.4) is phase I of attack policy shows that the attack reads the data in this step. Next step
is the injection of some data (disruptive resource) as Fig. 2.4 shows.
Figure 2.4: Phase II of replay attack [1]











where T = kr + 1 − k0. In replay attack, attacker reads data from k = k0 to kr, gathering the
sequence data lk and then begins replaying the recorded data at time k = kr + 1 until the end of
attack at kf . buk , b
y
k are attack signals in input and output which are described in Eq. (2.2). In this
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type of attack, attacker needs no information about model of system, and if he have access to all
channels, he can be stealthy.
2.1.2 Zero Dynamic Attack









ak, attack signal is defined as ak = γkg, where γ ∈ C are the roots that causes matrix p(γ),
represented in Eq. (2.7), to lose the rank. In discrete time system the minimum phase zeros are
defined |γ| < 1 and for zero dynamic attack we just consider the non-minimum phase zeros,
|γ| > 1, because they just can cause zero dynamic attack which makes the system unbounded [50].
p(γ) =
γI − A −B
C 0
 (2.7)
The input-zero direction is defined by solving the Eq. (2.8)









For some initial condition x0, g will be found. So, we have ak = γkg as zero dynamic attack. In
[3, 2], it is described for a continuous system as follows:
considering system (2.1), Invariant zeros of system are the complex values s ∈ C yields det(P (s))
in Eq. (2.7) (replacing γ with s) loses rank (Rank(P (s)) < n+min(m, p)). let z be an invariant
zero, and let x0 ,u0 such that: 
(sI − A)x0 −Bu0 = 0
Cx0 +Du0 = 0
(2.9)
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where x0, u0 are state zero direction and input zero direction. If we define trajectory x(t) =
x0e
zt and u as u0ezt so we have:
y(t) = Cx+Du = Cx0e
zt +Du0e
zt = ezt(Cx0 +Du0) (2.10)
The state trajectory x is called zero dynamic.
2.1.3 False Data Injection Attack
It is a type of attacks which injects an adversary signal to deceive the detector. Different papers
describe it in different ways. Pasqualetti in [2, 3], described it as follows. The attacker corrupts
the system dynamics and measurements to render the unstable mode p unobservable from the
measurement. Dynamic false data injection attacks require access to some sensors and knowledge
of system dynamics to be implemented.
Figure 2.5: false data injection attack [2]
Dynamic false data injection attack acts as it makes change the states in a way that it makes one
unstable mode but we do not see the effect of that state in the output of system, so we do not detect
attack. Liu et al. [33] described it as following: As Fig. 2.5 shows, for this type of attack attacker
needs just perfect information of system, no need to read data of channels (an open loop attack)
and also needs to disruptive resources. Considering system (2.1), if we have noise in measurement
and assuming D = 0, we have:
y(t) = Cx+ e (2.11)
So, we define matrix W as covariance matrix compounds of covariance of each noise in diagonal
elements and zero for other elements in matrix. Therefore, we estimate x as xˆ = (CTWC)−1CTWy.
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If we have state estimator, residual will be r = y − xˆ, and for being stealthy, ||y − xˆ|| < τ should
be satisfied, where τ is a threshold that is defined in system. Now Attacker acts in a way that it
adds an amount to y and xˆ as follows:

ya = y + a,
xˆbad = xˆ+ d
(2.12)
||ya − Cxˆbad|| = ||y + a− Cxˆ− Cd|| = ||y − Cxˆ+ a− Cd︸ ︷︷ ︸ || = ||y − Cxˆ|| (2.13)
If ||a − Cd|| = 0 we will have ||ya − Cxˆbad|| = ||y − Cxˆ|| < τ so the attack is stealthy and can
not be detected. If we write the system as Eq. (2.14)

ya = y + a,
||y − Cxˆ|| = ||y + a− C(xˆ+ d)|| = ||y − Cxˆ+ a− Cd|| ≤ ||y − Cxˆ||+ ||a− Cd||
(2.14)
Even if we have ||a−Cd|| < τa, in which τa = τ−||y−Cxˆ||, we do not detect the attack, because
we still have this condition:||y − Cxˆ|| ≤ τ [33].
2.1.4 Covert Attack
Pasqualetti et al. [2, 3] described that this type of attacker should know dynamic model of the
system and read both channel input and output, and inject data on both channels in a way that ya
which attack injects in output neutralizes the effect of injected input attack ua.
Figure 2.6: Covert attack [2]
If we assume x is the state without attack and x˜ is the state under attack, in covert attack,
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attacker injects the signal u as input and y = Cx− Cx˜ as output, in which:

x˙ = Ax+Bu
y = C(x− x˜)
(2.15)
Actually the covert attack input is (Bu,−Cx˜), where x˜ satisfies ˙˜x = Ax˜ + Bu with x˜(0) = 0.
In this type of attack, attacker needs the full knowledge of model system, reads both channels
(disclosure resources), and injects attacks on both channels (disruptive resources).
2.1.5 Denial of Service Attack
In Denial of service attack, the attacker does not need to know the dynamic of system and read
the data, just he prevents the data to reach the actuator or from sensor to controller (availability
property).
2.1.6 Eavesdropping Attack
Eavesdropping attack read the data, in each of the channels or both of them (disclosure re-
source).








Figure 2.7: 3-D attack space [3]
2.2 Definition of Periodogram
In signal processing, a Periodogram is an estimate of the spectral density of a signal. Pe-
riodogram calculates the significance of different frequencies in time-series data to identify any
intrinsic periodic signal.






where f is the frequency in which the PSD is calculated around and it is − 1
2∆t





is sampling time. The integral of the true PSD, P (f), over one period, 1
∆t
for cyclical
frequency and 2pi for normalized frequency, is equal to the variance of the wide-sense stationary






















x(t)dt, and ω = 2pif is frequency in radians per second. The interpretation of this form of the
theorem is that the total energy of a signal can be calculated by summing power-per-sample across
time or spectral power across frequency. The area under the PSD curve is equal to power of the
signal (total signal power), R(0), the autocorrelation function at zero lag. This is also the variance
of the signal. The statistical average of a certain signal as analyzed in terms of frequency content,
is called spectrum. When the energy of signal is concentrated around a finite time interval, if its
total energy is finite, the ”Energy Spectral Density” can be computed, as more commonly used.
Otherwise for signals whose energies are unlimited, we calculate their power as PSD, a statement
of power existing in the signal as a function of frequency. The unit of energy spectral density is ω
Hz
.
The class of stationary random processes which do not have finite energy and hence do not have
the Fourier transform, and such signals have finite average power and hence are characterized by
a power density spectrum. PSD of a signal is Fourier transformation of Autocorrelation function.










The method of averaged periodograms, more commonly known as Welch’s method, in which a
long x[n] sequence is divided into multiple shorter, and possibly overlapping parts. It computes a
windowed Periodogram of each one, and computes an average array, i.e. an array which each ele-
ment is an average of the corresponding elements of all the periodograms. For stationary processes,
this reduces the variance of the signal [51], [52], [53].
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Chapter 3
Attack Detection Using Multi-Sine
Watermarking
The objective of this thesis is to develop an approach for detecting replay attacks based on wa-
termarking. In this chapter, we begin by introducing the problem and reviewing our assumptions.
Next we present our proposed method, develop the design procedure for generating the watermark-
ing signal and explain the process for detecting replay attacks. A case study will be presented in
the next chapter to illustrate and assess the method.
3.1 Problem Statement
As described in Chapter 2, when replay attack occurs (Fig. 3.1 and Fig. 3.2), the attacker
records the output of the system for interval δ, when the system is in steady state (phase 1). Then
the attacker replaces the output data with the recorded and its repetitions. At the same, the attacker
















(c) Phase 2: Attacker replays the recorded output and alters the control sihnal
Figure 3.1: Different phases of replay attack
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(a) Attacker records the output data
(b) Attacker replays the recorded output
Figure 3.2: Different steps of replay attack
As it is shown in Fig. 3.2, the attacker firstly records the data when the closed loop output
reaches the steady state and then apply the attack. Here are some assumptions:
• The plant is single-input-single-output, possibly nonlinear. and under control in a feedback
loop.
• The plant is subject to input and output noise.




In this section, we propose and develop a method for detecting replay attack using watermark-
ing. Watermarking starts when the closed loop system reaches steady state. Fig. 3.3 shows the
linear model of the system around its operating point. Let U0 and Y0 denote the controller and the
plant output around operating point.
Figure 3.3: Model of a linear system
where K(s) and Gmy(s) are the controller and plant transfer functions, r(t), m(t), w(t) are ref-
erence input, watermarking signal and plant input disturbance. Furthermore, v(t) is the output
(sensor) noise. Thus y˜(t) is the measured output. The watermarking signal, m(t), is added, so that
its effect can be traced in the plant. The absence of such effect in the measured output y˜(t) can be
an indication of a replay attack. The signal m(t) must be chosen so that:
1. the effect of m(t) in the output can be easily traced (despite the disturbance, noise, and
replay attack)
2. an attacker cannot detect the watermarking signal fast enough to adjust the replay attack.
3. the plant output is not perturbed significantly and its fluctuation remains at an acceptable
level.
As mentioned in Chapter 1, random IID signals have been proposed for watermarking in [10]. In
this thesis, we propose to use sinusoidal signals. The effect of such a signal in the output of the
plant will be a signal too. The power of a sinusoidal signal is concentrated in a narrow frequency
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band which makes it easy to be detected. This helps with satisfying item 1 above. Another benefit
of using sinusoidal signals compared with random IID signals is that the latter changes abruptly
which increases the stress on actuators. A a sinusoidal input, however, changes smoothly. In order
to make it difficult for an attacker to adjust its replay attack in response to watermarking (item 2
above), we change the frequency of sinusoidal signal. We refer to each time interval where the
frequency of sinusoid is kept constant as a ”frame”. The length of a frame should be long enough
so that the effect of watermarking can be detected by the controller. However, the frame length has
to be so short that the attacker cannot detect the watermarking and adjust to it. This issue will be
discussed later in this section. To address the third issue above (i.e limiting output fluctuations due
to watermarking), we will show that using a suitable multi-sine signal can suppress the transient
response of the plant due to watermarking. This is particularly useful in transition from one frame
to the next frame. As a result, the output fluctuations due to watermarking will reduce to the steady
state response. The amplitude of the steady state response can be easily computed analytically
and adjusted. This is not the case with the random watermarking signal). Another benefit of our
method is that (as will be seen) only the value of frequency response at the closed loop system at
the watermarking frequencies are needed (which can be obtained experimentally). The complete
model is not needed.
3.2.1 Transient Response Suppression
As mentioned before, in this thesis we propose the use of multi-sine signals for watermarking.
The proposed watermarking consists of a sequence of multi-sine signals, each applied for an inter-
val called a frame. In order to minimize the effect of watermarking on the plant output, we choose
the multi-sine signals in such a way that they do not generate any transient response in plant output.
The absence of transient response also helps with detecting the effect of watermarking in the plant














We will show that, given a set of frequencies, the amplitudes Ai, phases φi and the number of
sinusoidal signals, nm, can be chosen such that in the output (y(t)), there is no transient response.
We present the answer in the form of a solution for the following problem.
Problem: Given a stable system with a strictly proper transfer function Gmy(s) and initially, at
rest, find a multi-sine input signal m(t) =
∑nm
i=1 Ai sin(ωit + φi) with minimum number terms
applied at t = 0, such that the output does not contain transient response.
Figure 3.4: model of system from m(t) to y(t)
We will present a closed-form solution for the first-order and second-order systems, following
a time-domain approach. Next, we will provide a solution based on a frequency-domain approach
which is not closed-form but is easier to use for higher order systems.
(a) Time-Domain Approach
(1) First order systems
Suppose Gmy(s) is a first-order system given by the differential equation:
dy
dt
+ ay(t) = bm(t) (3.1)
where ”a” and ”b” are parameters. We will see that the minimum number of sinusoidal
signals in this case is nm = 1. Suppose m(t) = A1 sin(ω1t+ φ1) (t ≥ 0). Then y(t) will be
y(t) = k1e
−at + A1|Gmy(jw1)| sin(ω1t+ φ1 + ]Gmy(jω1)) (3.2)
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The first and the second terms are transient and steady state response. respectively,Gmy(jω1)
is the transfer response at frequency ω1, and ]Gmy(jω1)) is the phase of Gmy(jω) at ω1.
The transient response will be suppressed (k1 = 0) if and only if the steady-state response
satisfies the initial condition; that is yss(0) = 0. Thus, at t = 0
A1|Gmy(jω1)| sin(φ1 + ]Gmy(jω1)) = 0 (3.3)
Assuming Gmy(jω1) 6= 0, we conclude:
φ+ ]Gmy(jω1) = 2lpi for l = 0, 1, · · · .
In particular, for l = 0, we can choose φ = −]Gmy(jw1). In this case A1, w1 can be chosen
arbitrarily. Eq. (3.3) guarantees that there will be no transient part (k1 = 0).
(2) Second order systems














The steady-state solution must satisfy the initial conditions (in order to have transient re-
sponse suppressed). If m(t) is a single sinusoid, m(t) = A1 sin(ω1(t) + φ1), it is easy to see
that steady state response A1|Gmy(jω1)| sin(ω1t+φ1 +]Gmy(jω1) = 0 cannot satisfy both
initial conditions. y(0) = 0 and dy/dt(0) = 0. Hence m(t) must have at least 2 sinusoid
signals. Let m(t) = A1sin(w1t+ φ1) + A2sin(w2t+ φ2). Therefore
yss(t) = A1|Gmy(jω1)| sin(ω1t+ φ1 + ]Gmy(jω1)) + A2|Gmy(jω2)| sin(ω2t+ φ2
+ ]Gmy(jω2)) (3.5)
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Without loss of generality, assume w2 > w1, and A1 > 0 and A2 > 0 yss must satisfy the
initial conditions which yields Eq. (3.6)

yss(0) = A1|Gmy(jw1)| sin(φ1 + ]Gmy(jω1)) + A2|Gmy(jω2)| sin(φ2 + ]Gmy(jω2)) = 0
dyss(0)
dt
= a1ω1 cosα1 + a2ω2 cosα2 = 0
(3.6)
where α1 = φ1+]Gmy(jω1), α2 = φ2+]Gmy(jω2). LetA1|Gmy(jω1)| = a1,A2|Gmy(jω2)|
= a2. Therefore
a1sinα1 + a2sinα2 = 0 (3.7a)
a1w1cosα1 + a2w2cosα2 = 0 (3.7b)
From Eq. (3.7) and assuming a1 6= 0 we get:




(1− (a22/a21) sin2 α2
= ±
√




(a21 − a22 + a22cos2α2
a1
(3.9)
Combination Eq. (3.7b) and Eq. (3.9) gives:
|w1
√
(a21 − a22 + a22cos2α2)| = | − a2w2cosα2| (3.10)
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Thus Case 1: a1 6= a2. It follows from Eq. (3.10) that
w21(a
2
1 − a22 + a22cos2α2) = a22w22cos2α2 (3.11a)
w21(a
2
1 − a22) = a22(w22 − w21)cos2α2 (3.11b)
cosα2 = ±(w1/a2)
√
(a21 − a22)/(w22 − w21) (3.11c)
cosα2 = ±
√
((a1/a2)2 − 1)/(w2/w1)2 − 1 (3.11d)
Therefore
(a1/a2)
2 ≤ (w2/w1)2 (3.12)
Since w2 > w1, we can conclude:
a2 < a1 (3.13)
In summary, the solution in this case is given by Eq. (3.13), Eq. (3.11d) and Eq. (3.8).
Case 2: if a1 = a2
It follows from Eq. (3.7a) that sinα1 = − sinα2, which results in α1 = −α2, or α1 = pi+α2.
For the first case, cosα1 = cosα2, and using Eq. (3.7b), (a1w1 + a2w2) cosα1 = 0. This




, α2 = −pi
2
(3.14a)






For the second case, α1 = pi + α2, cosα1 = − cosα2, so (a1w1 − a2w2) cosα1 = 0, thus
cosα1 = 0 (since a1w1 − a2w2 = a1(w1 − a2w2) 6= 0.) Therefore, in this case, α1 = pi2 ,
α2 = −pi2 or α1 = −pi2 , α2 = −3pi2 (same as the first case)
(3) Third order systems
For the third-order system, we show 2 sin signals is enough to suppress the transient part.
For this, the steady state response must satisfy y(0) = 0, dy(0)
dt





results in the following:
a1 sinα1 + a2 sinα2 = 0 (3.15a)
a1ω1 cosα1 + a2ω2 cosα2 = 0 (3.15b)
a1ω
2
1 sinα1 + a2ω
2
2 cosα2 = 0 (3.15c)
Here, ai and di are defined similar to the case of second-order systems. From Eq. (3.15a)











For satisfying Eq. (3.16), sinα1,sinα2 6= 0, we can conclude ω1 = ω2 which is impossible
by assumption. Therefore it must be the case that sinα1 = 0 and sinα2 = 0. Hence Hence,
α1 = k1pi k1 : integer
α2 = k2pi k2 : integer
(3.17)
We only need to consider four cases αi = 0, pi (i = 1, 2) which
Case (1): α1=α2 = 0, which is not acceptable since it violates Eq. (3.15b).
Case (2): α1=α2 = pi, which is not acceptable since it violates Eq. (3.15b).















+ · · ·+ a0y(t) = bn−1d
n−1m
dtn−1







bn−1sn−1 + · · ·+ b1s+ b0
sn + an−1sn−1 + · · ·+ a1s+ a0 (3.19)
The watermarking signal is a multi-sine signal m(t) =
∑nm




(s2 + ω21) · · · (s2 + ω2nm)
(3.20)
where pm(s) is a polynomial of degree 2nm − 1 or lower, as we have:
0 ≤ deg(pm(s)) ≤ 2nm − 1 (3.21)




a(s)(s2 + ω21) · · · (s2 + ω2nm)
(3.22)
A necessary and sufficient condition to suppress the transient response (which is due to the
poles of Gmy(s)) is that the poles of Gmy(s) can be canceled by zeros of M(s); in other
words, pm(s) must be chosen as
pm(s) = c(s)a(s) (3.23)
For some polynomial c(s). this implies that:
deg(a(s)) ≤ deg(pm(s)) ≤ 2nm − 1 (3.24)
Thus












is the ceiling function. Once nm is chosen based on Eq. (3.25), c(s) in Eq. (3.23)
is chosen so that Eq. (3.21) is satisfied. The watermarking signal M(s) is obtained from Eq.
(3.20) and m(t) is obtained using partial fraction expansion.
Example: Second order system. Suppose n = 2, and
Gmy(s) =
b1s+ b0





From Eq. (3.23) it follows that:






So, the smallest nm is 2 and
m(t) = A1 sin(ω1t+ φ1) + A2 sin(ω2t+ φ2) (t > 0) (3.29)





2 + a1s+ a0)
Any choice of c1 and c0 results in suppression of transient response. Of course the trivial case of
















3.2.2 Amplitude of Sine Waves
The multi-sine watermarking signal results in fluctuations in plant output given by
nm∑
i=1
Ai|Gmy(jwi)| sin(ωit+ φi + ]G(jwi)) (3.30)
The amplitude Ai should be chosen so that
(i) The output perturbations are small enough that do not degrade the quality of output regula-
tion, and
(ii) The output perturbations are large enough to be detected and distinguished from noise. The
issue detection, it will be described in detail in section (3.2.4).
Let α =
∑nm
i=1 Ai|Gmy(jwi)|, as upper bound of amplitude of sine signal in output, β=sensor
accuracy, δ denotes the maximum acceptable output fluctuations (due to watermarking, noise, dis-
turbance.) Suppose δ can be defined as δ = δm + δd in which δm is the maximum fluctuation
due to watermarking, and δd pertains to the rest (noise, etc.). To meet (i) and (ii), we require that
β < α < δm. Furthermore, the power of watermarking signal should be sufficiently high so that
the corresponding effects can be detected in the presence of noise and other disturbances. The
ratio of the power of the output fluctuations due to watermarking to that of noise and disturbance

















The SNR can be used to compare the effects of watermarking and disturbance. Here, σw and σv
are the variances of input and output disturbance signals. If the plant input and output have the












Ai’s should be chosen to result in smallest η that permits the detection of watermarking effects.
3.2.3 Frequencies of Sine Waves and Frame Size









frequency in (Hz), and period of each component respectively. To simplify the design, we choose






= · · · = fnm
nnm
We assume integers are relatively prime (i.e. gcd((n1, n2, · · · , nnm) = 1). This ensures that m(t)
is a periodic signal with period Tcombined = n1T1 = n2T2 = · · · = nnmTnm . The size of each frame
for watermarking is chosen to be a multiple of Tcombined. This will ensure that at the end of frame,
when m(t) is cut, no transient response is generated. Without loss of generality assume that fi’s
are in increasing order: f1 ≤ f2 ≤ · · · ≤ fnm . Also let Tf denote the frame size for signal m(t).
As mentioned before, Tf is chosen to be a multiple of Tcombined: Tf = kTcombined for some positive
integer k. As will be explained, we will use the periodogram of plant output (as an estimate of
power spectral density, PSD) to detect the presence of sinusoids in the watermarking signal. We
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n2 − n1 since Tcombined =
n1
f1
Since f1 < f2 and n1 < n2, the above condition is satisfied since Tf is chosen as a multiple of
P (i.e. Tf = kTcombined ≥ P ≥ Tcombinedn2−n1 ). In the special case of n2 − n1 = 1, it is better to
avoid the borderline case of Tf = Tcombined and choose Tf ≥ 2Tcombined. In order to be able to
choose Tf = P , it is better to choose f1, f2 such that n2 − n1 6= 1, for example n2n1 = 53 or 31 .
Choosing low values for frequencies fi results in large combined period Tcombined of watermarking
signal and large frame size Tf . This will provide more time to the attacker to detect watermarking
and probably adjust to it. On the other hand, increasing the frequencies will result in small η at
large frequencies fi’s |Gmy(jw)| is smaller, unless large watermarking signal (Ai) is used. Another
drawback of large frequencies is that due to modeling uncertainty at high frequencies, frequency
response values are less accurate at high frequencies. This results in lower accuracy in design
calculations for watermarking.
3.2.4 Detection of Watermarking Signal
The multi-sine watermarking signal results in fluctuations in plant output given by Eq. (3.30).
The set of frequencies (ω1, · · · , ωnm) is changed from frame to frame. Suppose that the closed-
loop system is in steady state, operating at a setpoint (i.e. the reference input, r(t), in Fig (3.3)
is a constant). Then to detect the signal of Eq. (3.30) and distinguish it from output disturbance,
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one could record the output over the corresponding frame and determine its PSD to confirm the
presence of sine signals at frequencies ω1, · · · , ωnm . In this thesis, periodogram is used to estimate
PSD. There are also other methods such as modified periodogram, and parametric methods for
estimating PSD. A detailed analysis of these methods in order to determine the most suitable one














Figure 3.5: Model of control system with PSD detector
If the reference input r(t) is not a setpoint and varies with time, then the plant output will
change accordingly and the PSD of output has power in frequencies other than the watermarking
frequencies. In such a case, frequencies ω1, · · · , ωnm may not easily be seen unless the amplitudes
Ai|Gmy(jwi)| are sufficiently large. Large fluctuations due to watermarking are not desirable. In














Signal   
Attacker
+
Figure 3.6: Model of control system with Kalman filter detector
In this setup, in the absence of attack (and faults), the residual signal only contain noise. In the
presence of replay attack, the residual signal will include the effects of watermarking signal. The
frequencies of watermarking signal can be detected in the residual signal using a PSD estimator.
The detection of the frequencies would also indicate that changes in residual signal is not because
of a fault.
3.2.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we presented a method for detecting replay attacks. The method is based on
watermarking using multi-sine signals. A method for suppression of transient response in plant
output was discussed and choosing frequencies, amplitudes and frame sizes were discussed. In
Chapter 4, a model of a laboratory tank is presented and a detailed analysis of the application of
the proposed method is provided.
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Chapter 4
Replay Attack Detection in a Tank System
In this chapter, we apply the watermarking procedure for replay attack detection described
in Chapter 3 to a tank system. We begin by introducing a nonlinear model of the tank system
and its feedback control system. Next following the proposed process in Chapter 3, we design a
watermarking signal. Finally, we present the simulation results and discuss various design aspects
and their impact on the final results.
4.1 Plant Model
The plant is a single water tank used in a flow control system (Fig. 4.1). The parameters are




= Q1 −Q2 (4.1)





Figure 4.1: Schematic diagram of tank system
where az = 0.45, outflow coefficient (correcting factor, dimensionless)
S = 5× 10−5 m2, the cross sectional area of output pipe
A = 0.0154 m2 is the area of tank, and g = 9.81 m/s2 is gravity











The tank is part of a flow control system in which the output flow (Q2) is measured and regulated
by adjusting input flow (Q1). The operating point value of output flow is chosen here to be:
Q2o =5.46× 10−5 m3/s
= 54.6 ml/s
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)2 = 0.3 m
Suppose h(t), q1(t) and q2(t) denotes deviations from operating point values:
h =H −Ho
q1 = Q1 −Q1o
q2 = Q2 −Q2o



















Let w(t) and v(t) denote input and output disturbance, both assumed to be Gaussian white noise,
with zero mean and variances σ2ω = 2 × 10−14(m3/s)2 and σ2v = 8.25 × 10−15(m3/s)2. These
correspond to standard deviations of 0.14 ml/s and 0.09 ml/s.




=− 5.9× 10−3h(t) + 64.9q1(t) + 64.9w(t)
q2(t) =9.1× 10−5h(t) + v(t)
(4.5)
The transfer function of tank will be G = 5.88×10
−3





. Next, a PI controller
(5.5s+0.1)
s
is designed and step response characteristics for closed loop system will be derived as:
Rise Time: 41.48 s
Settling Time: 206.46 s
Overshoot: 11.85 %
41
The closed loop poles are located at−0.0192±j0.0149. The block diagram of the feedback system
is given in Fig. 4.2. The linear model in Simulink is given in Fig. 4.3 and Fig. 4.4.
Figure 4.2: Flow feedback control system
Figure 4.3: Linearized model of system in Simulink
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Figure 4.4: Sine wave section in Simulink
4.2 Watermarking Signal








are both second order transfer functions.
Since Gmq2 is second order, following the discussion in sec. (3.2.1), the multi-sine signal m(t)
must include at least two frequencies, so that transient responses can be suppressed. Let
m(t) = A1 sin(ω1t+ φ1) + A2 sin(ω2t+ φ2)














































Figure 4.5: Bode diagrams of Grq2 and Gmq2
The frequencies are chosen from frequencies in which Gmq2(jω) has relatively high values:
0.01 ≤ ω ≤ 0.6. For the purpose of this study, three frames are considered:
Frame 1:
w1 = 0.01, w2 = 0.03, n2n1 = 3 =⇒ Tcombined = T1 = 3× T2 = 628 s
Frame 2:
w3 = 0.07, w4 = 0.1167, n4n3 =
5
3
=⇒ Tcombined = 3× T3 = 269 s
Frame 3:
w5 = 0.2, w6 = 0.6, n6n5 = 3 =⇒ Tcombined = T5 = 3× T6 = 31.4 s




− ]Gmq2(jw1) and φ2 = −pi2 − ]Gmq2(jw2)
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Following the discussion in Section 3.2.2, an upper bound for output fluctuations due to water-
marking is:
α = A1|Gmq2(jω1)|+ A2|Gmq2(jω2)|
= 2A1|Gmq2(jω1)|
= 2A2|Gmq2(jω2)|
AmplitudeA1 andA2 are chosen so thatA1|Gmq2(jw1)| = A2|Gmq2(jw2)|. Maximum permissible
fluctuation of this laboratory tank is due to watermarking in water level is assumed to be 2 cm or
6.7% of operating point. Based on Eq. (4.4), max fluctuation of output flow (when h = 0.02 m)
is δm = 1.8 ml/s or 3.3% of operating point value (5.4 × 10−5). We choose A1 and A2, so that




2A1 × 0.095 < 1.8× 10−6
or
A1 < 9.5× 10−6













The values of sine wave amplitudes for the other two frames are found similarly. In the following,
we will examine watermarking and its detection for three different choices of η.
4.3 Detection with Periodogram
4.3.1 Case 1: α = 6.72× 10−8 and η = 0.04, linear system
First, we choose α = 6.72 × 10−8, which means A1|Gmq2(jw1)| = 3.36 × 10−8 or A1 =
3.54 × 10−7 m3/s. The value of A2 and the amplitude for sine waves for frame 2 and 3 are
computed similarly (based on the same value of α). Firstly, we apply just sine wave, without
reference input, r(t) = 0 and without noise, and then the effect of noise and reference input in
further is considered. Firstly, just in frame 1 the output of applying phasing and no phasing signals
are compared to each other, and then it is expanded to 3 frames. The Fig. 4.6 shows just for frame
1 of applying sine signals. In Fig. 4.7 and Fig. 4.8 for one and two combined period(s), the outputs
are shown and as can be seen, the curves which phasing are applied to, do not have any transient
part compared to the curve which φ has not been applied. These tests are applied on linear system
based on Eq. (4.4) and in the following figures the results are presented. The sinusoids ”with
phasing” are as following:
3.548× 10−7 sin(0.01t+ 0.66) + 2.26× 10−7 sin(0.03t− 1.3)
4.128× 10−7 sin(0.07t+ 2.58) + 6.72× 10−7 sin(0.11t− 0.33)
1.14× 10−6 sin(0.2t+ 2.94) + 3.41× 10−6 sin(0.6t− 0.06)
and the sine signals ”without phasing” are:
3.548× 10−7 sin(0.01t) + 2.26× 10−7 sin(0.03t)
4.128× 10−7 sin(0.07t) + 6.72× 10−7 sin(0.11t)
1.14× 10−6 sin(0.2t) + 3.41× 10−6 sin(0.6t)
For each frame, t is the time from the start of the corresponding frame. The watermarking signal
and in particular, the phase shifts φ1 and φ2 have been chosen to suppress the transient response.
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Output (m3/s) for 2 cases, with/without phasing in T
combined for frame 1
with phasing
no phasing
Figure 4.6: Output of system, watermarking for one frame, Tf = Tcombined of sine signal, without
noise
Fig. 4.6 shows that for input with phasing, output does not have transient, after t= 629 s, there
is trivial fluctuation in output which is absent in the case of watermarking signal with phasing.















Output (m3/s) for 2 cases, with/without phasing in frame size = T
combined for each frame
with phasing
no phasing
Figure 4.7: Output of system, in frame size Tf = Tcombined, 3 frames, without noise
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Output (m3/s) for 2 cases, with/without phasing in frame size = 2T
combined for each frame
with phasing
no phasing
Figure 4.8: Output of system in frame size Tf = 2 Tcombined in 3 frames, without noise
periodograms: As mentioned in previous chapter, one way for controller to track the effects
of watermarking in the plant output is through the output signal’s periodogram. Specifically, the
controller can obtain the periodogram of output segments corresponding to each frame. The result
of our example are provided in Fig. 4.9 for the case Tf = Tcombined and Fig. 4.10 for the case
Tf = 2Tcombined.
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Figure 4.9: The periodogram of 3 frames, each frame Tf = Tcombined, without noise
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Figure 4.10: The periodogram of 6 sine signals, 3 frames, each frame Tf = 2 Tcombined, with
noise
As can be seen in Fig. 4.9 and Fig. 4.10, periodograms of Tf = 2Tcombined are sharper com-
pared to other one, which is because the resolution of periodogram is inverse of recording time
(∆f = 1
Tf
). As can be observed, the frequencies of 3 frames are detected. Next we repeat the sim-
ulation with the same initial conditions, reference input. The output signal and the periodograms
of the output for each frame are shown in Fig. 4.11 and Fig. 4.12. In order to see the effect of
phasing, two simulations are performed, one without and one with phasing. We observe that in
both cases, the watermarking frequencies can be identified in the output.
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Figure 4.11: (a): The output of system with process and sensor noise, without reference input, (b)
the periodogram of frame 1, Tf = 2 Tcombined, with noise, with/without phasing
Furthermore, the periodogram of with phasing and without phasing cases are very similar. It
seems that the benefit of transient suppression is in time domain and in limiting output fluctuations.
In this simulation, the ratio of the worst case fluctuation due to watermarking to 3σ value of input








This shows that the amplitude of fluctuations from watermarking is much smaller than the distur-
bance.
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Since the output signal is stochastic, its periodogramis stochastic. In Fig. 4.12, teh periodograms
of three frames are provided for another output sample. The watermarking frequencies are easily
detectable.









Periodogram of output, without phasing for frame 2
w3=0.07,w4=0.11 rad/s









Periodogram of output, with phasing for frame 2
w3=0.07,w4=0.11 rad/s












Periodogram of output without phasing for frame 3
w5=0.2,w6=0.6 rad/s












Periodogram of output with phasing for frame 3
w5=0.2,w6=0.6 rad/s
Figure 4.12: Another sample of Periodogram of 4 sine signals, frames 2 and 3, each frame
Tf = 2 Tcombined, with noise, with/without phasing
Attacker’s analysis:
Now let us look at analysis of the output from an attacker’s point of view. In a replay attack, the
attacker does not need to know much about the plant , and simply records and replays the system
output. Now suppose the attacker intends to examine the output for trace of watermarking. The
attacker knows neither the frequencies used in watermarking (not even the signal type), nor the
start time and the size of frames. In the following, we examine a few cases. Here, watermarking
is done using three frames and for each frame Tf = 2Tcombined. The watermarking with phasing is
used and simulation is done in the presence of process and sensor noise. The frames are:
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Frame 1: 0 ≤ t ≤ 1256, Frame 2: 1256 ≤ t ≤ 1794, Frame 3: 1794 ≤ t ≤ 1857











10-13 Periodogram of output from t=200 s to  t=1113 s
(a) Periodogram of output, from t=200 s to t=1113 s










10-13 Periodogram of output from t=0 s to t=1857 s, the end of frame 3
(b) Periodogram of output for 3 frames, from t=0 s to t=1857 s
Figure 4.13: Periodogram of output, with phasing signal in Tf = 2 Tcombine
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10-13 Periodogram of output when the time is from t=600 s to t=1525 s
(a) Periodogram of output, from t=600 s to t=1525 s













10-14 Periodogram of output when the time is from t=400 s to t=628 s
(b) Periodogram of output, from t=400 s to t=628 s
Figure 4.14: Periodogram of output, with phasing signal in Tf = 2 Tcombine
In Fig. 4.13a, the attacker records and examines the output for 200 ≤ t ≤ 1080 which almost
corresponds to frame 1. The watermarking frequencies of 0.01 rad/s and 0.03 rad/s are detectable;
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however, by the t = 1080 s, frame 1 is almost over and frame 2 with new watermarking frequen-
cies will start. Therefore, the result of analysis is not useful for attacker. In Fig. 4.13b, the attacker
examines the output from t = 0 s to t = 1857 s. More frequencies are detected; however, similar
to previous case, the result may not be useful for attacker. In Fig. 4.14b, the output is examined
at shorter period t = 600 s to t = 1525 s. This period of time covers second half of frame 1 and
the first half of frame 2. Four frequencies are detectable; however, it is not known if all belong to a
single frame or multiple frames. In this case, by the time that the frequencies are detected, half of
frame 2 has passed, and it would be too late for attacker to artificially add sine waves to the output
signal sent to the controller. Finally, In Fig. 4.14, the attacker examines a much smaller slice of
output between t = 400 s and t = 628 s. This interval falls in 1
3
of the period of watermarking of
sine wave of frame 1. As a result, only frequency 0.03 rad/sec is detected and 0.01 goes undetected
by the attacker.
4.3.2 Case 2: α = 6.72× 10−8 and η = 0.04, nonlinear system
Figure 4.15: Nonlinear model of system in Simulink
In this subsection, we repeat the simulation of the previous case with two changes. First we
use the nonlinear model of the plant. Secondly, we assume the plant initially is not at its operating
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point. Q2(0) = 5.38×10−5, and the initial level H(0) = 0.29 m (resulting Q2(0) = 5.385×10−5
and initial condition for block of 1
s
in PID controller is 5.4 × 10−5. Also the reference input
r(0) = 5.3× 10−5 and a step input applied to system at t = 0 s, and r(t) becomes 5.4× 10−5 for
t > 0. The plant output and measured output are shown in Fig. 4.16. Watermarking signal (with
phasing) is done from t = 0 s (with Tf = 2 Tcombined), as was done in case 1. Note that it takes
about 200 s for the output to settle and to reach steady state.













10-5 Plant output of system around operating point 5.4*10-5 m3/s










10-5 Measured  output of system around operating point 5.4*10-5 m3/s
Figure 4.16: The plant and measured output for nonlinear system with noise, with reference input,
watermarking signal with phasing in frame size Tf = 2 Tcombined for each frame, starting from
t = 0 s
In Fig. 4.17 the periodogram of 3 frames can be seen. We observe that the result is very similar
to periodogram of Fig. 4.10 of linear system. The similarity is to be expected since deviations of
system from the operating point are small and therefore the linear and nonlinear simulations have
close results.
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Periodogram of sensor output with phasing for the first frame
w1=0.01,w2=0.03 rad/s








Periodogram of sensor output with phasing for the second frame
w3=0.07,w4=0.11 rad/s








Periodogram of sensor output with phasing for the third frame
w5=0.2,w6=0.6 rad/s
Figure 4.17: Periodogram of 3 frames, each frame Tf = 2 Tcombined, for the nonlinear system
4.3.3 Case 3: α = 2.3544× 10−8 and η = 0.0049, linear system
In this case, we use the linear model to simulate a replay attack and explore the detection of
attack by controller using the periodogram of output frames.
Similar to case 1, the reference input is zero. The plant is subject to process and sensor noise.
Watermarking is similar to case 1 with one difference, the value of η. Using trail and error we
have found the smallest amplitude of sine waves for which the effects of watermarking can be
detected from the output using periodogram. The value for η is 0.0049, which corresponds to α =
2.3544× 10−8, and |AiGmq2(jωi)| = 2.3544×10−82 = 1.1772× 10−8. We will discuss watermarking
with and without phasing. All frame sizes are twice the combined period: Tf = 2Tcombined. The
sinusoids with phasing are as following:
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1.24× 10−7 sin(0.01t+ 0.66) + 7.92× 10−8 sin(0.03t− 1.3)
1.44× 10−7 sin(0.07t+ 2.58) + 2.35× 10−7 sin(0.11t− 0.33)
3.997× 10−7 sin(0.2t+ 2.94) + 1.1953× 10−6 sin(0.6t− 0.06)
and the sine signals without phase are:
1.24× 10−7 sin(0.01t) + 7.92× 10−8 sin(0.03t)
1.44× 10−7 sin(0.07t) + 2.35× 10−7 sin(0.11t)
3.99× 10−7 sin(0.2t) + 1.1953× 10−6 sin(0.6t)
For each frame, time t is from the start time of the corresponding frame. In Fig. 4.18, the effect of
noise is considered, and the plant output under noise is depicted.
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Plant output of system around operating point 5.4*10-5 m3/s
Without phasing
With phasing
(a) Plant output of linearized system around the operating point with/without phasing in Simulink

























10-4 State of plant around operating point, 0.3 m, with applying sine signal with phasing
(b) Water level (h) of linearized system around the operating point with applying sine signal with
phasing in Simulink
Figure 4.18: Plant output and state of linearized system around the operating point with/without
phasing, with noise in Simulink
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Next, we describe the attack scenario. Fig. 4.19 shows the block diagram of the closed-loop
system of the linearized system. Here, qa2(t) denotes the actual value of output and q2(t) is the
measured value (i.e. sensor reading). We assume the sensor is ideal with the exception of the
noise: q2(t) = qa2(t) + v(t). Furthermore, q
c
2(t) denotes the information received by the controller.
In the absence of attack: qc2(t) = q2(t). During a replay attack, the attacker replaces q2(t) with
prerecorded segments of q2(t). In our case, we assume that q2(t) is recorded between t = 600 s
and t = 800 s. Then after t = 800 s, the output segments from t = 600 s to t = 800 s is
played back (supplied as qc2(t)). As an illustrative example in Fig. 4.20, the output signal received
by the controller, qc2(t), is depicted. In this simulation the noise is assumed zero to improve the
clarity of the signal. In Fig. 4.19 the controller uses qc2(t), calculates a control command, and adds
the watermarking signal, and the output will be uc(t). The overall signal will be U(t) = U0 + uc
where U0 is controller output at the operating point. We assume that the attacker replace U(t) with
1.2U(t) (i.e. amplifies the control signal). Thus in the linearized model, the signal added by the
attacker, uattack(t) is 
uattack =(1.2U(t)− U0)− uc(t)
= 0.2U0(t) + 0.2uc(t)
The control output at the operating point is U0 = 5.4 × 10−5 m3/s. The results of simulation






















Figure 4.19: Replay attack
In Fig. 4.20, the output under attack is shown in which watermarking signal frame size is
Tf = 2 Tcombined of frame 1, without noise.
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Figure 4.20: Fake plant output with attack, without noise
Figure 4.21: Real and fake output of plant, qa2(t) and q
c
2(t), with attack, without noise
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Figure 4.22: Real and fake output of sensor,q2(t) and qc2(t) with attack, with noise
Now let us examine the periodogram of the signal received by controller (qc2(t)) and see how
it can be used to detect the replay attack. From the point of view of Fig. 4.23 and Fig. 4.24
and Fig. 4.25 depict the periodograms of sensor readings for the three frames. The watermarking
frequencies can be easily detected from the periodograms.
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10-14 Periodogram of output from t=0 s to t=1857 s
Figure 4.23: periodogram in frame size Tf = 2 Tcombined in 3 frames
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Figure 4.24: Periodogram of output for frame 1, Tf = 2 Tcombined with and without phasing, with
noise
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(a) Periodogram of output for frame 2, Tf = 2 Tcombined with and without phasing
















(b) Periodogram of output for frame 3, Tf = 2 Tcombined with and without phasing
Figure 4.25: Periodogram of output for frame size Tf = 2 Tcombined for frame 2 and 3, with and
without phasing, with noise
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Fig. 4.26 and Fig. 4.27 provide periodograms in dB (for watermarking with phasing). Addi-
tionally 0.95%- confidence lower and upper bounds are provided. We observe that the magnitude
of periodograms at the watermarking frequencies (shown with a horizontal line) are about 15dB
larger than the other frequencies.
Next the periodogram of output signal received by controller (qc2(t)) under attack are shown in Fig.
4.28 and Fig. 4.29. In Fig. 4.28b, the watermarking frequencies can be seen. This can be justified
by the fact that the attack starts at t = 800 s, well into the first frame and the signal played back
is the sensor readings from frame 1. Fig. 4.29a and Fig. 4.29b show the periodogram of frames 2
and 3. We see that the watermarking frequencies of frames 2 and 3 are not presented which could
indicate an attack.
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(a) Periodogram with 95% confidence bound of output without attack, in frame size
Tf = 2 Tcombined for 3 frames



















(b) Periodogram with 95% confidence bound of output without attack, in frame 1,
Tf = 2 Tcombined
Figure 4.26: Periodogram with 95% confidence bound of output without attack, with noise, with
phasing, for frame 1 and all frames Tf = 2 Tcombined
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(a) Periodogram with 95% confidence bound of output without attack, for frame 2,
Tf = 2 Tcombined

















(b) Periodogram with 95% confidence bound of output without attack, for frame 3,
Tf = 2 Tcombined
Figure 4.27: Periodogram with 95% confidence bound of output without attack, with noise, with
phasing, for frames 2 and 3, Tf = 2 Tcombined for each frame
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(a) Periodogram with 95% confidence bound of output under attack, for 3 frames,
Tf = 2 Tcombined




















(b) Periodogram with 95% confidence bound of output under attack, for frame 1,
Tf = 2 Tcombined
Figure 4.28: Periodogram with 95% confidence bound of output under attack, with phasing, with
noise for frame 1 and 3 frames, Tf = 2 Tcombined
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(a) Periodogram with 95% confidence bound of output under attack, for frame 2,
Tf = 2 Tcombined



















(b) Periodogram with 95% confidence bound of output under attack, for frame 3,
Tf = 2 Tcombined
Figure 4.29: Periodogram with 95% confidence bound of output under attack, with phasing, with
noise for frames 2 and 3, Tf = 2 Tcombined
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4.4 Detection with Kalman Filter
In this section, the detection of replay attack via a Kalman filter is studied. In [10], Mo et
al. showed a replay attack cannot be necessarily detected using Kalman filter and proposed wa-
termarking with random signals as a solution. Here, we propose watermarking using multi-sine
waves estimating state x and output y via Kalman filter. As can be seen in the following case study,
when there is no attack, Kalman filter detects nothing. When attack occurs, the Kalman filter im-
mediately detects it since ex (error of estimating state) and ey (error of estimating state) become
noticeable. Thus we can find out that an attack is happening. For this purpose, 3 different cases
are examined. In each case, x, y, ex, ey and histogram of ex and ey are shown for 100 samples. All
of the figures are drawn with frame size Tf = 2 Tcombined for each frame.
• Case 1: In the linearized system, the reference input which is input deviation around the
operating point is zero, and just watermarking sine signals with phasing and process and
measurement noise are the inputs of system. The system is assumed to be in operating point
and watermarking signals are applied at t = 0 s. Attack scenario is similar to Section
4.3.3. Fig. 4.30 shows that with watermarking signal, Kalman filter detects the attack. The
inputs to Kalman filter are output signal received by controller, and input signal generated
by controller (which includes the watermarking signal).
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Fake output received by controller
Estimated






















(a) Kalman filter result on y output

































(b) Kalman filter result on state x (water level h)
Figure 4.30: Case 1: Kalman filter result for x, y in case of watermarking with sine wave with
phasing
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• Case 2: In this case, it is assumed that the reference input is a small value 0.1 × 10−5, and
process and measurement noise present, without any watermarking sine wave.
(a) Kalman filter result on y output
(b) Kalman filter result on state x (water level h)
Figure 4.31: Case 2: Kalman filter result for x, y in case of reference input and no watermarking
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As can be seen, in this case, no attack is detected as it was expected. In the absence of
watermarking, Kalman filter cannot detect the attack which occurs at t = 800 s. The output
in both cases with and without noise are shown in the following figures (Fig. 4.32).
(a) Real and fake output of system with attack, without noise

















10-6 Sensor reading and signal recieved by the controller affected by attack
fake output  under attack
real output  under attack
(b) Real and fake output of system with attack, with noise
Figure 4.32: Real and fake output of system under attack with/without noise
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10-7 Plant output (m3/s)  with/without attack without noise
Outout (m3/s) of system without attack
Output of system (m3/s) under attack
Figure 4.33: Fake output of plant with attack and real output of plant without attack
In Fig. 4.33, the repeated output signal which is produced by the attacker and the output
without attack are shown.
• Case 3: In this case, it is assumed that reference input r(t) = 0.1 × 10−5 for t > 0 and
also watermarking sine wave with phasing is injected to the closed loop system and noise
is present. The results are presented in Fig. 4.34 and Fig. 4.35. Kalman filter results (Fig.
4.35) show that an attack is occurring”.
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10-7 Output (m3/s) of system with/without attack without noise
Outout (m3/s) of system without attack
Output of system (m3/s) under attack
(a) Fake output of plant with attack and real output of plant without attack, with watermarking sin
signal















10-6 Measured output  affected by attack
fake output  under attack
real output  under attack
(b) Real and fake output of system with attack with watermarking sine wave, with noise


































(a) Kalman result for y output
(b) Kalman result for x (hight of tank)




In this chapter, the model of a laboratory tank was studied (linear and non-linear), and based on
its parameters, multi-sine watermarking signals were designed, and the effect on plant output was
used using periodograms. Then replay attack was described and simulated, and the periodogram of
output under attack was studied. From the results, it would be seen that the periodogram of output
under attack does not show properly the watermarking frequencies. Therefore using this method
we could easily recognize an attack was happening. Next, the use of Kalman filter along with
watermarking was studied .If there was no watermarking, after attack started, the residual signals
were near zero. But if watermarking was applied, during attack, the residuals become large and
from that we could conclude that an attack was happening.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion and Future Works
5.1 Conclusion
In this thesis, the problem of detecting replay attack in networked control systems was consid-
ered. Existing solutions to the attack detection problem were explained and their advantages and
disadvantages were highlighted. Due to the importance of the research topic and the drawbacks
of the available methods in the literature, a novel method was proposed in order to detect replay
attack in networked control systems.
The proposed method is watermarking using multi-sine waves. The main advantage of this
method is that it only requires the frequency response of the closed loop system at the watermarking
frequencies. This information can be obtained experimentally. This also means that model of the
system is not required. Another feature of this approach is that no assumption is made on the
control law: it can be a PID, LQG or any other types of controller. Multi-sine wave are smooth
and do not wear the actuators and the fluctuations that they cause in plant output can be easily
calculated and limited.
5.2 Future Work
Some suggestions for future research in this area are outlined below:
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• Studding modified periodogram, parametric periodogram methods for power spectral density
instead of non-parametric Periodogram to determine the best approach to track watermarking
signals.
• Instead of sinusoids, a white Gaussian IID signal also can be proposed. Instead of a perfect
white Gaussian IID noise, a periodic white Gaussian IID noise, which in some intervals of
time is zero, can be studied. Current results are with LQG controller. The research can be
expanded to the other controllers such as PID controller.




[1] A. Teixeira, I. Shames, H. Sandberg, and K. H. Johansson, “A secure control framework for
resource-limited adversaries,” Automatica, vol. 51, pp. 135–148, 2015.
[2] F. Pasqualetti, F. Dorfler, and F. Bullo, “Control-theoretic methods for cyberphysical secu-
rity: Geometric principles for optimal cross-layer resilient control systems,” IEEE Control
Systems, vol. 35, no. 1, pp. 110–127, 2015.
[3] F. Pasqualetti, F. Do¨rfler, and F. Bullo, “Attack detection and identification in cyber-physical
systems,” IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control, vol. 58, no. 11, pp. 2715–2729, 2013.
[4] M. Bishop, Computer security: art and science. Addison-Wesley Professional, 2003.
[5] R. Mitchell and I.-R. Chen, “A survey of intrusion detection techniques for cyber-physical
systems,” ACM Computing Surveys (CSUR), vol. 46, no. 4, p. 55, 2014.
[6] A. A. Ca´rdenas, S. Amin, Z.-S. Lin, Y.-L. Huang, C.-Y. Huang, and S. Sastry, “Attacks against
process control systems: risk assessment, detection, and response,” in Proceedings of the 6th
ACM symposium on information, computer and communications security. ACM, 2011, pp.
355–366.
[7] D. Ding, Q.-L. Han, Y. Xiang, X. Ge, and X.-M. Zhang, “A survey on security control and
attack detection for industrial cyber-physical systems,” Neurocomputing, vol. 275, pp. 1674–
1683, 2018.
82
[8] G. A. Tsiamis, K. Gatsis, “State estimation codes for perfect secrecy,” 2017 IEEE 56th Annual
Conference on Decision and Control, CDC, pp. 176–181, 2017.
[9] F. Miao, Q. Zhu, M. Pajic, and G. J. Pappas, “Coding schemes for securing cyber-physical
systems against stealthy data injection attacks,” IEEE Transactions on Control of Network
Systems, vol. 4, no. 1, pp. 106–117, 2017.
[10] Y. Mo, R. Chabukswar, and B. Sinopoli, “Detecting integrity attacks on scada systems,” IEEE
Transactions on Control Systems Technology, vol. 22, no. 4, pp. 1396–1407, 2014.
[11] S. Weerakkody, Y. Mo, and B. Sinopoli, “Detecting integrity attacks on control systems using
robust physical watermarking,” in Decision and Control (CDC), 2014 IEEE 53rd Annual
Conference on. IEEE, 2014, pp. 3757–3764.
[12] Y. Mo, T. H.-J. Kim, K. Brancik, D. Dickinson, H. Lee, A. Perrig, and B. Sinopoli, “Cyber–
physical security of a smart grid infrastructure,” Proceedings of the IEEE, vol. 100, no. 1, pp.
195–209, 2012.
[13] Y. Mo and B. Sinopoli, “Secure control against replay attacks,” in Communication, Control,
and Computing, 2009. Allerton 2009. 47th Annual Allerton Conference on. IEEE, 2009, pp.
911–918.
[14] N. E. Wu and X. Wang, “A pulse-compression method for process monitoring,” in Proceed-
ings of the 2001 American Control Conference.(Cat. No. 01CH37148), vol. 3. IEEE, 2001,
pp. 2127–2130.
[15] J. F. Hauer and J. G. DeSteese, “A tutorial on detection and characterization of special behav-
ior in large electric power systems,” Pacific Northwest National Lab.(PNNL), Richland, WA
(United States), Tech. Rep., 2004.
83
[16] J. W. Pierre, N. Zhou, F. K. Tuffner, J. F. Hauer, D. J. Trudnowski, and W. A. Mittelstadt,
“Probing signal design for power system identification,” IEEE Transactions on Power Sys-
tems, vol. 25, no. 2, pp. 835–843, 2009.
[17] J. F. Hauer, W. A. Mittelstadt, K. E. Martin, J. W. Burns, H. Lee, J. W. Pierre, and D. J.
Trudnowski, “Use of the wecc wams in wide-area probing tests for validation of system
performance and modeling,” IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, vol. 24, no. 1, pp. 250–
257, 2009.
[18] N. Zhou, J. W. Pierre, and J. F. Hauer, “Initial results in power system identification from
injected probing signals using a subspace method,” IEEE Transa ctions on Power Systems,
vol. 21, no. 3, pp. 1296–1302, 2006.
[19] C. M. Verrelli, P. Tomei, and E. Lorenzani, “Persistency of excitation and position-sensorless
control of permanent magnet synchronous motors,” Automatica, vol. 95, pp. 328–335, 2018.
[20] K. L. Morrow, E. Heine, K. M. Rogers, R. B. Bobba, and T. J. Overbye, “Topology pertur-
bation for detecting malicious data injection,” in 2012 45th Hawaii International Conference
on System Sciences. IEEE, 2012, pp. 2104–2113.
[21] F. Miao, M. Pajic, and G. J. Pappas, “Stochastic game approach for replay attack detection,”
in Decision and control (CDC), 2013 IEEE 52nd annual conference on. IEEE, 2013, pp.
1854–1859.
[22] F. Pasqualetti, F. Do¨rfler, and F. Bullo, “Cyber-physical attacks in power networks: Models,
fundamental limitations and monitor design,” in Decision and Control and European Control
Conference (CDC-ECC), 2011 50th IEEE Conference on. IEEE, 2011, pp. 2195–2201.
[23] Y. Chen, S. Kar, and J. M. F. Moura, “Dynamic attack detection in cyber-physical systems
with side initial state information,” IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control, vol. 62, no. 9,
pp. 4618–4624, 2017.
84
[24] Z. Guo, D. Shi, K. H. Johansson, and L. Shi, “Optimal linear cyber-attack on remote state
estimation,” IEEE Transactions on Control of Network Systems, vol. 4, no. 1, pp. 4–13, 2017.
[25] C. Schellenberger and P. Zhang, “Detection of covert attacks on cyber-physical systems by
extending the system dynamics with an auxiliary system,” in Decision and Control (CDC),
2017 IEEE 56th Annual Conference on. IEEE, 2017, pp. 1374–1379.
[26] S. Weerakkody and B. Sinopoli, “Detecting integrity attacks on control systems using a mov-
ing target approach,” in Decision and Control (CDC), 2015 IEEE 54th Annual Conference
on. IEEE, 2015, pp. 5820–5826.
[27] M. Krotofil, A. Cardenas, J. Larsen, and D. Gollmann, “Vulnerabilities of cyber-physical
systems to stale data—determining the optimal time to launch attacks,” International journal
of critical infrastructure protection, vol. 7, no. 4, pp. 213–232, 2014.
[28] R. S. Smith, “Covert misappropriation of networked control systems: Presenting a feedback
structure,” IEEE Control Systems, vol. 35, no. 1, pp. 82–92, 2015.
[29] E. Bou-Harb, “A brief survey of security approaches for cyber-physical systems,” in 2016 8th
IFIP International Conference on New Technologies, Mobility and Security (NTMS). IEEE,
2016, pp. 1–5.
[30] A. Humayed, J. Lin, F. Li, and B. Luo, “Cyber-physical systems security—a survey,” IEEE
Internet of Things Journal, vol. 4, no. 6, pp. 1802–1831, 2017.
[31] A. A. Ca´rdenas, S. Amin, and S. Sastry, “Research challenges for the security of control
systems.” in HotSec, 2008.
[32] M. Leccadito, T. Bakker, R. Klenke, and C. Elks, “A survey on securing uas cyber physical
systems,” IEEE Aerospace and Electronic Systems Magazine, vol. 33, no. 10, pp. 22–32,
2018.
85
[33] Y. Liu, P. Ning, and M. K. Reiter, “False data injection attacks against state estimation in elec-
tric power grids,” ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC), vol. 14,
no. 1, p. 13, 2011.
[34] H. Sandberg, A. Teixeira, and K. H. Johansson, “On security indices for state estimators
in power networks,” in First Workshop on Secure Control Systems (SCS), Stockholm, 2010,
2010.
[35] F. Pasqualetti, F. Do¨rfler, and F. Bullo, “Attack detection and identification in cyber-physical
systems,” IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control, vol. 58, no. 11, pp. 2715–2729, 2013.
[36] T. Irita and T. Namerikawa, “Detection of replay attack on smart grid with code signal and
bargaining game,” in 2017 American Control Conference (ACC). IEEE, 2017, pp. 2112–
2117.
[37] H. Fawzi, P. Tabuada, and S. Diggavi, “Secure estimation and control for cyber-physical
systems under adversarial attacks,” IEEE Transactions on Automatic control, vol. 59, no. 6,
pp. 1454–1467, 2014.
[38] Y. Mo, E. Garone, A. Casavola, and B. Sinopoli, “False data injection attacks against state
estimation in wireless sensor networks,” in 49th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control
(CDC). IEEE, 2010, pp. 5967–5972.
[39] Y. Mo and B. Sinopoli, “False data injection attacks in cyber physical systems,” in First
Workshop on Secure Control Systems, 2010.
[40] M. Pajic, S. Sundaram, G. J. Pappas, and R. Mangharam, “The wireless control network: A
new approach for control over networks,” IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control, vol. 56,
no. 10, pp. 2305–2318, 2011.
86
[41] S. Sundaram and C. N. Hadjicostis, “Distributed function calculation via linear iterative
strategies in the presence of malicious agents,” IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control,
vol. 56, no. 7, pp. 1495–1508, 2010.
[42] F. Pasqualetti, A. Bicchi, and F. Bullo, “Consensus computation in unreliable networks: A
system theoretic approach,” IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control, vol. 57, no. 1, pp.
90–104, 2011.
[43] M. S. Mahmoud, M. M. Hamdan, and U. A. Baroudi, “Modeling and control of cyber-
physical systems subject to cyber attacks: a survey of recent advances and challenges,” Neu-
rocomputing, vol. 338, pp. 101–115, 2019.
[44] Y. Yuan, Q. Zhu, F. Sun, Q. Wang, and T. Bas¸ar, “Resilient control of cyber-physical systems
against denial-of-service attacks,” in Resilient Control Systems (ISRCS), 2013 6th Interna-
tional Symposium on. IEEE, 2013, pp. 54–59.
[45] W. Lucia, B. Sinopoli, and G. Franze, “A set-theoretic approach for secure and resilient con-
trol of cyber-physical systems subject to false data injection attacks,” in Cyber-Physical Sys-
tems Workshop (SOSCYPS), Science of Security for. IEEE, 2016, pp. 1–5.
[46] S. B. Rebaı¨, H. Voos, and S. A. S. Alamdari, “A contribution to cyber-physical systems secu-
rity: an event-based attack-tolerant control approach,” IFAC-PapersOnLine, vol. 51, no. 24,
pp. 957–962, 2018.
[47] W. Li, Y. Shi, and Y. Li, “Research on secure control and communication for cyber-physical
systems under cyber-attacks,” Transactions of the Institute of Measurement and Control, p.
0142331219826658, 2019.
[48] D. E. Miller and E. J. Davison, “An adaptive controller which provides an arbitrarily good
transient and steady-state response,” IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control, vol. 36, no. 1,
pp. 68–81, 1991.
87
[49] J. C. Piquette, “Method for transducer transient suppression. i: Theory,” The Journal of the
Acoustical Society of America, vol. 92, no. 3, pp. 1203–1213, 1992.
[50] A. Teixeira, I. Shames, H. Sandberg, and K. H. Johansson, “Revealing stealthy attacks in
control systems,” in 50th Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Com-
puting, Allerton, IL, USA, October 01-05, 2012. IEEE conference proceedings, 2012, pp.
1806–1813.
[51] G. P. John, G. M. Dimitris, and G. Manolakis, “Digital signal processing: Principles, algo-
rithms and applications,” Pentice Hall, 1996.
[52] F. Auger and P. Flandrin, “Improving the readability of time-frequency and time-scale rep-
resentations by the reassignment method,” Transactions on Signal Processing, vol. 43, pp.
1068–1089, May 1995.
[53] S. A. Fulop and K. Fitz, “Algorithms for computing the time-corrected instantaneous fre-
quency (reassigned) spectrogram, with applications,” the Acoustical Society of America, vol.
119, pp. 360–371, 2006.
[54] X. Xie, D. Zhou, and Y. Jin, “Strong tracking filter based adaptive generic model control,”





1 % S i m u l a t e s t h e a p p l i c a t i o n o f i n p u t s i n e s i g n a l s
2 % v e r s i o n : 15 Oct . 2019
3 % Azam Ghamari
4
5
6 c l e a r a l l ;
7 c l c ;
8 c l o s e a l l ;
9 gr = 9 . 8 1 ; % m/ s ˆ1
10 a l p h a = 0 . 4 5 0 2 8 9 ;
11 AA= 0 . 0 1 5 4 ; % mˆ2
12 S=5∗10ˆ−5; % mˆ2
13
14 % O p e r a t i n g p o i n t
15 %
89
16 h0 = 0 . 3 ; % m
17 q10= a l p h a ∗S∗ s q r t (2∗ gr ∗h0 ) ;
18 q20=q10 ;
19
20 % L i n e a r i z e d model
21 %
22 b e t a =AA/ ( a l p h a ˆ2 ∗ S ˆ2 ∗ gr ) ;
23 num=1;
24 den =[ b e t a ∗q20 1 ] ;
25 g= t f ( num , den ) ;
26
27 % C o n t r o l l e r
28 %
29 k= t f ( [ 5 . 5 0 . 1 ] , [ 1 0 ] ) ;
30 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%Noise
31 sigmaw= s q r t (0 .02∗10ˆ −12) ;
32 s igmah= s q r t (0 .01∗10ˆ −4) ;
33 s igmav= a l p h a ∗S∗ s q r t ( g r / ( 2 ∗ h0 ) ) ∗ s igmah ;
34 Q=0.02∗10ˆ−12; %p r o c e s s i n g n o i s e
35 R=82.81∗10ˆ−16; %measurement n o i s e
36 % Q=0.02∗10ˆ−8;
37 % R=82.81∗10ˆ−12;
38 sigmaw= s q r t (Q) ;
39 s igmav= s q r t (R) ;
40
41 % T r a n s f e r f u n c t i o n s
42 g o l = s e r i e s ( k , g ) ;
90
43 Gry= f e e d b a c k ( gol , 1 ) ;
44 Gdy= f e e d b a c k ( g , k ) ;
45 Gvy= f e e d b a c k ( 1 , g∗k ) ;
46 Gru= f e e d b a c k ( k , g ) ;
47 Gvyy= f e e d b a c k ( g∗k , 1 ) ;
48 %%%%% s t e a d y s t a t e o f Gru
49 [ num11 , den11 ] = t f d a t a ( Gru , ’ v ’ ) ;
50 [ A11 , B11 , C11 , D11]= t f 2 s s ( num11 , den11 ) ;
51 s y s r u = s s ( A11 , B11 , C11 , D11 ) ;
52 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%Bode Diagram
53 s t e p i n f o ( Gry )
54 f i g u r e ( 1 )
55 s u b p l o t ( 2 , 1 , 1 )
56 bode ( Gry )
57 l e g e n d ( ’ Bode of Gry ’ )
58 s u b p l o t ( 2 , 1 , 2 )
59 bode ( Gdy )




64 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%C o n s i d e r i n g Per iodogram
65
66 w1 = 0 . 0 1 ; % F r e q u e n c i e s o f s i n e s
67 w2=w1∗3 ;
68 f1 =w1 / ( 2 ∗ p i ) ;
69 f2 =w2 / ( 2 ∗ p i ) ;
91
70 p1 =(2∗ p i ) / w1 ; % P e r i o d s o f s i n e s
71 p2 =(2∗ p i ) / w2 ;
72 p=3∗p2 ; % P e r i o d of combined s i n e
73 t f = f l o o r (1∗ p ) ; % d u r a t i o n o f s i m u l a t i o n
74
75 w3 = 0 . 0 7 ; % F r e q u e n c i e s o f s i n e s
76 w4=w3∗ 1 . 6 7 ;
77 f3 =w3 / ( 2 ∗ p i ) ;
78 f4 =w4 / ( 2 ∗ p i ) ;
79 p3 =(2∗ p i ) / w3 ; % P e r i o d s o f s i n e s
80 p4 =(2∗ p i ) / w4 ;
81 pp=3∗p3 ; % P e r i o d of combined s i n e
82 t f f = f l o o r (1∗ pp ) ; % d u r a t i o n o f s i m u l a t i o n
83
84 w5 = 0 . 2 ; % F r e q u e n c i e s o f s i n e s
85 w6=w5∗3 ;
86 f5 =w5 / ( 2 ∗ p i ) ;
87 f6 =w6 / ( 2 ∗ p i ) ;
88 p5 =(2∗ p i ) / w5 ; % P e r i o d s o f s i n e s
89 p6 =(2∗ p i ) / w6 ;
90 ppp =3∗p6 ; % P e r i o d of combined s i n e
91 t f f f = f l o o r (1∗ ppp ) ; % d u r a t i o n o f s i m u l a t i o n
92
93
94 [ G1mag , G1ph ]= bode ( Gdy , w1 ) ;
95 [ G2mag , G2ph ]= bode ( Gdy , w2 ) ;
96 A1= ( 0 . 0 7∗ s q r t ( s igmav ˆ2 + sigmaw ˆ 2 ) ) / G1mag ;
92
97 %A1= s q r t ( 0 . 0 0 4 ∗ ( s igmav ˆ2 + sigmaw ˆ 2 ) / G1mag ˆ 2 ) ;
98 A2=(A1∗G1mag ) / G2mag ;
99 ph i1 =( p i / 2 )− ( ( G1ph∗ p i ) / 1 8 0 ) ;
100 ph i2 =−( p i / 2 )− ( ( G2ph∗ p i ) / 1 8 0 ) ;
101
102
103 [ G3mag , G3ph ]= bode ( Gdy , w3 ) ;
104 [ G4mag , G4ph ]= bode ( Gdy , w4 ) ;
105 A3= ( 0 . 0 7∗ s q r t ( s igmav ˆ2 + sigmaw ˆ 2 ) ) / G3mag ;
106 A4=(A3∗G3mag ) / G4mag ;
107 ph i3 =( p i / 2 )− ( ( G3ph∗ p i ) / 1 8 0 ) ;
108 ph i4 =−( p i / 2 )− ( ( G4ph∗ p i ) / 1 8 0 ) ;
109
110
111 [ G5mag , G5ph ]= bode ( Gdy , w5 ) ;
112 [ G6mag , G6ph ]= bode ( Gdy , w6 ) ;
113 A5= ( 0 . 0 7∗ s q r t ( s igmav ˆ2 + sigmaw ˆ 2 ) ) / G5mag ;
114 A6=(A5∗G5mag ) / G6mag ;
115
116 ph i5 =( p i / 2 )− ( ( G5ph∗ p i ) / 1 8 0 ) ;
117 ph i6 =−( p i / 2 )− ( ( G6ph∗ p i ) / 1 8 0 ) ;
118
119 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%t
120 t s a m p l e = 0 . 0 1 ;
121 f s =1 / t s a m p l e ;
122 t 1 =0 : t s a m p l e : 2∗ t f ;
123 t 2 =( t 1 ( : , end ) + t s a m p l e ) : t s a m p l e : 2 ∗ ( t f + t f f ) ;
93
124 t 3 =( t 2 ( : , end ) + t s a m p l e ) : t s a m p l e : 2 ∗ ( t f + t f f + t f f f ) ;
125 n t 1 = s i z e ( t1 , 2 ) ;
126 n t 2 = s i z e ( t2 , 2 ) ;
127 n t 3 = s i z e ( t3 , 2 ) ;
128 t =[ t 1 t 2 t 3 ] ;
129 t s =0 : t s a m p l e : ( t ( 1 , end ) ) ;
130 n t 4 = s i z e ( t , 2 ) ;
131 n t 5 = s i z e ( t s , 2 ) ;
132 n t 6 = s i z e ( t s , 2 )−s i z e ( t , 2 ) ;
133 n t 7 = s i z e ( t1 , 2 ) + s i z e ( t2 , 2 ) ;
134
135 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%Noise
136 v=sigmav ∗ r andn ( s i z e ( t s ) ) ;
137 w=sigmaw∗ r andn ( s i z e ( t s ) ) ;
138 N=cov ( v ,w) ;
139 %%%%%%%% s y s open loop
140 [ numo , deno ] = t f d a t a ( g , ’ v ’ ) ;
141 [ Ao , Bo , Co , Do]= t f 2 s s ( numo , deno ) ;
142 syso = s s ( Ao , Bo , Co , Do ) ;
143 %%%%%%%%%%%Making D i s c r e t e
144 sysod = c2d ( syso , 1 ) ;
145 %[ num111 , den111 ] = t f d a t a ( g , ’ v ’ ) ;
146 %sysod = s s ( Ao , Bo , Co , Do , 0 . 0 1 ) ;
147 Aod= sysod . a ;
148 Bod= sysod . b ;
149 Cod= sysod . c ;
150 Dod= sysod . d ;
94
151 Gd1 = c2d ( g , 0 . 0 1 , ’ i m p u l s e ’ ) ;
152 kd1 = c2d ( k , 0 . 0 1 , ’ i m p u l s e ’ ) ;
153 %%%%%%%% s y s C o n t r o l l e r
154 [ numc , denc ] = t f d a t a ( k , ’ v ’ ) ;
155 [ Ac , Bc , Cc , Dc]= t f 2 s s ( numc , denc ) ;
156 s y s c = s s ( Ac , Bc , Cc , Dc ) ;
157 s y s c d =c2d ( sysc , 1 ) ;
158 %s y s c d = s s ( Ac , Bc , Cc , Dc , 1 ) ;
159 Acd= s y s c d . a ;
160 Bcd= s y s c d . b ;
161 Ccd= s y s c d . C ;
162 Dcd= s y s c d . d ;
163 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%c l o s e loop s s
164 [ num , den ] = t f d a t a ( Gry , ’ v ’ ) ;
165 [A, B , C ,D]= t f 2 s s ( num , den ) ;
166 s y s = s s (A, B , C ,D) ;
167 [ b , a ]= s s 2 t f (A, B , C ,D) ;
168 % sys1 = s e r i e s ( sysc , sy so ) ;
169 % s y s = f e e d b a c k ( sys1 , + 1 ) ;
170 % [A, B , C ,D]= s s d a t a ( s y s ) ;
171 % [ b , a ]= s s 2 t f (A, B , C ,D) ;
172 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
173 r =0.1∗10ˆ−5∗ ones ( nt5 , 1 ) ; %%%% d e l t a i n p u t r e f e r e n c e f o r
l i n e a r i z e d model
174 dsa =[A1∗ s i n ( w1∗ t 1 ) + A2∗ s i n ( w2∗ t 1 ) A3∗ s i n ( w3∗ t 2 ) +A4∗ s i n ( w4∗ t 2 )
A5∗ s i n ( w5∗ t 3 ) +A6∗ s i n ( w6∗ t 3 ) ] ; % no p h a s i n g
95
175 dsb =[A1∗ s i n ( w1∗ t 1 + ph i1 ) + A2∗ s i n ( w2∗ t 1 + ph i2 ) A3∗ s i n ( w3∗ ( t2−t 2
( 1 , 1 ) ) + ph i3 ) +A4∗ s i n ( w4∗ ( t2−t 2 ( 1 , 1 ) ) + ph i4 ) A5∗ s i n ( w5∗ ( t3−t 3
( 1 , 1 ) ) + ph i5 ) +A6∗ s i n ( w6∗ ( t3−t 3 ( 1 , 1 ) ) + ph i6 ) ] ; % p h a s i n g f o r
p r e v e n t i n g t r a n s i e n t s
176 % dsa =[A1∗ s i n ( w1∗ t 1 ) + A2∗ s i n ( w2∗ t 1 ) z e r o s ( 1 , n t 6 ) ] ; % no
p h a s i n g
177 % dsb =[A1∗ s i n ( w1∗ t 1 + ph i1 ) + A2∗ s i n ( w2∗ t 1 + ph i2 ) z e r o s ( 1 , n t 6 ) ] ;
178 X=10ˆ−5∗ r andn ( nt5 , 1 ) ;
179 Y=X;
180 Y( [ 2 0 0 0 : 3 0 0 0 0 4000:10000 50000:70000 1 1 0 0 0 0 : 1 1 4 0 0 0 ] ) =0 ;
181 % Y = s i n ( ( 0 : t s ( 1 : end ) ) ∗ p i / 1 8 0 ) ;
182 % a l p h a = 0 . 9 6 ;
183 % Z = a l p h a ∗ X + (1 −a l p h a ) ∗Y;
184 %mean ( a u t o c o r r (X) )
185 %mean ( a u t o c o r r ( Z ) )
186 v a r (X)
187 v a r (Y)
188 ya= l s i m ( Gdy , dsa ’ , t s ) + l s i m ( Gdy , w’ , t s ) + l s i m ( Gvy , v ’ , t s ) ; %% y wi th
n o i s e w i t h o u t p h a s i n g
189 ya1= l s i m ( Gdy , Y, t s ) + l s i m ( Gdy , w’ , t s ) +10ˆ−6∗ ones ( s i z e ( t , 2 ) , 1 ) ; %%y
w i t h o u t n o i s e w i t h o u t p h a s i n g
190 %yb= l s i m ( Gdy , dsb ’ , t s ) + l s i m ( Gdy , w’ , t s ) + l s i m ( Gvy , v ’ , t s ) + l s i m ( Gry , r ,
t s ) ; %%y wi th p h a s i n g
191 %yb= l s i m ( Gdy , dsb ’ , t s ) + l s i m ( Gdy , w’ , t s ) + l s i m ( Gvy , v ’ , t s ) ;
192 yb= l s i m ( Gdy , w’ , t s ) + l s i m ( Gvy , v ’ , t s ) + l s i m ( Gry , r , t s ) + l s i m ( Gdy , dsb ’ ,
t s ) ;
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193 ybr = l s i m ( Gdy , w’ , t s ) + l s i m ( Gvy , v ’ , t s ) + l s i m ( Gry , r , t s ) + l s i m ( Gdy , X, t s )
;%%% y wi th rand n i n p u t
194 yb1= l s i m ( Gdy , w’ , t s ) + l s i m ( Gdy , dsb ’ , t s ) + l s i m ( Gvyy , v ’ , t s ) ; %%y
w i t h o u t n o i s e wi th p h a s i n g
195 z1= t r a p z ( t s , yb . ˆ 2 ) ; %%%%%%%%% t h e a r e a under c u r v e o u t p u t ˆ2 =
e ne rg y of s i g n a l
196
197 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
198 [ u , ˜ , xc ]= l s i m ( sysc ,−yb , t s , 0 ) ; %%%o u t p u t o f c o n t r o l l e r
199 [ yo , ˜ , xo ]= l s i m ( syso , ( u+dsb ’+w’ ) , t s , 0 ) ; %%% o u t p u t o f System
200 %%%%%%%%%%%% o u t p u t w i t h o u t a t t a c k
201 f i g u r e ( 2 )
202 p l o t ( t s , yb1 , t s , ya1 , ’−− ’ )
203 x l a b e l ( ’ t ime ( s ) ’ )
204 y l a b e l ( ’ Outpu t (mˆ 3 / s ) ’ )
205 t i t l e ( ’ Outpu t (mˆ 3 / s ) f o r 2 c a s e s i n 2 combined p e r i o d i n each
i n t e r v a l w i t h o u t mesurement n o i s e ’ )
206 l e g e n d ( ’ w i th p h a s i n g ’ , ’ no p h a s i n g ’ )
207 g r i d
208 f i g u r e ( 2 2 2 )
209 p l o t ( t s , yb , t s , ya , ’−− ’ )
210 x l a b e l ( ’ t ime ( s ) ’ )
211 y l a b e l ( ’ Outpu t (mˆ 3 / s ) ’ )
212 t i t l e ( ’ Outpu t (mˆ 3 / s ) f o r 2 c a s e s , w i th / w i t h o u t p h a s i n g i n f rame
s i z e = 2 T { combined} f o r each f rame ’ )
213 l e g e n d ( ’ w i th p h a s i n g ’ , ’ no p h a s i n g ’ )
214 g r i d
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215 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%Apply ing Replay A t t a c k
216 %%%%%%%% U o u t p u t t o c o n t r o l l e r
217 %RR= r ( 8 0 0 / t s a m p l e : s i z e ( t s , 2 ) −1 ,1) ;
218 t 4 =800: t s a m p l e : t s ( 1 , end ) ;
219 KK=[ yb ( 6 0 0∗1 / t s a m p l e : 8 0 0∗1 / t s ample , 1 ) ; yb ( 6 0 0∗1 / t s a m p l e : 8 0 0∗1 /
t s ample , 1 ) ; yb ( 6 0 0∗1 / t s a m p l e : 8 0 0∗1 / t s ample , 1 ) ; yb ( 6 0 0∗1 / t s a m p l e
: 8 0 0∗1 / t s ample , 1 ) ; yb ( 6 0 0∗1 / t s a m p l e : 8 0 0∗1 / t s ample , 1 ) ; yb ( 6 0 0∗1 /
t s a m p l e : ( ( 6 0 0 ∗ 1 / t s a m p l e )−6+mod ( ( s i z e ( t , 2 ) −(800∗1/ t s a m p l e ) )
, 20000) ) , 1 ) ] ;
220 KK1=[ yb1 ( 6 0 0∗1 / t s a m p l e : 8 0 0∗1 / t s ample , 1 ) ; yb1 ( 6 0 0∗1 / t s a m p l e : 8 0 0∗1 /
t s ample , 1 ) ; yb1 ( 6 0 0∗1 / t s a m p l e : 8 0 0∗1 / t s ample , 1 ) ; yb1 ( 6 0 0∗1 /
t s a m p l e : 8 0 0∗1 / t s ample , 1 ) ; yb1 ( 6 0 0∗1 / t s a m p l e : 8 0 0∗1 / t s ample , 1 ) ;
yb1 ( 6 0 0∗1 / t s a m p l e : ( ( 6 0 0 ∗ 1 / t s a m p l e )−6+mod ( ( s i z e ( t , 2 ) −(800∗1/
t s a m p l e ) ) , 20000) ) , 1 ) ] ;
221 uu= l s i m ( sysc ,−KK, t4 , xc ( 8 0 0 / t s a m p l e ) ) ;%%%%% u o u t p u t o f c o n t r o l l e r
a f t e r a t t a c k
222 % %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% U o u t p u t o f sys tem
223 Dsb=dsb ( 1 , ( 8 0 0 / t s a m p l e : s i z e ( t , 2 ) −1) ) ;
224 Dsb=Dsb ’ ;
225 W=w( 1 , 1 : ( s i z e ( t s , 2 ) −800/ t s a m p l e ) ) . ’ ;
226 V=v ( 1 , 1 : ( s i z e ( t s , 2 ) −800/ t s a m p l e ) ) . ’ ;
227 %%%%%%%%%%p l o t o u t p u t o f t h e sys tem
228 %ybb= l s i m ( syso , ( uu+Dsb ) +W, t4 , xo ( 8 0 0 / t s a m p l e ) ) ; %%%%%o u t p u t o f
p l a n t a f t e r a t t a c k
229 yr = l s i m ( syso , 1 . 2 ∗ ( uu+Dsb ) +0.2∗5.4∗10ˆ−5+W, t4 , xo ( 8 0 0 / t s a m p l e ) ) ;%
%%%%r e a l o u t p u t a f t e r a t t a c k
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230 y r r =[ yb ( ( 1 : 8 0 0 / t s a m p l e ) , 1 ) ; y r +v ( 1 , ( 8 0 0 / t s a m p l e ) : n t4 −1) . ’ ] ; %%%%%
r e a l o u t p u t i n whole o f t h e t ime
231 %yws =[ t4 ’ ybs];%%%% f o r s i m u l i n k
232 ybbb =[ yb ( ( 1 : 8 0 0 / t s a m p l e ) , 1 ) ;KK] ; %%%%o u t p u t o f sys tem a f t e r
s e n s o r unde r a t t a c k
233 ybbs =[ yb1 ( ( 1 : 8 0 0 / t s a m p l e ) , 1 ) ;KK1 ] ;
234 f i g u r e ( 3 )
235 p l o t ( t s , ybbs , ’ b ’ ) ;
236 x l a b e l ( ’ t ime ’ ) ;
237 y l a b e l ( ’ o u t p u t (mˆ 3 / s ) ’ ) ;
238 t i t l e ( ’ y o u t p u t b e f o r e s e n s o r a f f e c t e d by a t t a c k ’ ) ;
239 % h1 = l i n e ( [ 8 0 0 800] ,[−2∗10ˆ−7 12∗10ˆ−7]) ;
240 % h2 = l i n e ( [ 2 0 0 0 2000] ,[−2∗10ˆ−7 12∗10ˆ−7]) ;
241 h1 = l i n e ( [ 8 0 0 800] ,[−2∗10ˆ−8 2∗10ˆ−8]) ;
242 h2 = l i n e ( [ 2 0 0 0 2000] ,[−2∗10ˆ−8 2∗10ˆ−8]) ;
243
244 % S e t p r o p e r t i e s o f l i n e s
245 s e t ( [ h1 h2 ] , ’ Co lo r ’ , ’ k ’ , ’ LineWidth ’ , 1 )
246 % Add a p a t c h
247 g ray = [ 0 . 7 0 . 7 0 . 7 ] ;
248 p a t c h ( [ 8 0 0 2000 2000 800] ,[−2∗10ˆ−8 −2∗10ˆ−8 2∗10ˆ−8 2∗10ˆ−8] ,
gray , ’ FaceAlpha ’ , 0 . 5 ) ;
249 t x t = ’ A t t a c k ’ ;
250 t e x t ( 1 0 0 0 , 1 .8∗10ˆ−8 , t x t , ’ F o n t S i z e ’ , 1 4 )
251 %t e x t ( 1 0 0 0 , 11∗10ˆ−7 , t x t , ’ Fon tS i ze ’ , 1 4 )
252
253 f i g u r e ( 4 )
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254 p l o t ( t s , ybbb , t s , y r r ) ;
255 x l a b e l ( ’ t ime ’ ) ;
256 y l a b e l ( ’ o u t p u t (mˆ 3 / s ) ’ ) ;
257 t i t l e ( ’ y o u t p u t a f t e r s e n s o r a f f e c t e d by a t t a c k ’ ) ;
258 l e g e n d ( ’ y under a t t a c k a f t e r s e n s o r ’ , ’ t h e r e a l o u t p u t o f sys tem
a f t e r s e n s o r ’ ) ;
259
260 f i g u r e ( 5 )
261 s u b p l o t ( 2 1 1 )
262 p l o t ( t s , yb1 , t s , [ yb1 ( ( 1 : 8 0 0 / t s a m p l e ) , 1 ) ; y r ] , ’−− ’ )
263 x l a b e l ( ’ t ime ( s ) ’ )
264 y l a b e l ( ’ Outpu t (mˆ 3 / s ) ’ )
265 t i t l e ( ’ Rea l \D e l t a Outpu t (mˆ 3 / s ) o f sys tem wi th / w i t h o u t a t t a c k ’
)
266 l e g e n d ( ’ y o u t p u t o f sys tem ’ , ’ y under a t t a c k ’ )
267 g r i d
268 s u b p l o t ( 2 1 2 )
269 p l o t ( t s , yb1 +5.4∗10ˆ−5∗ ones ( s i z e ( t , 2 ) , 1 ) , t s , [ yb1 ( ( 1 : 8 0 0 / t s a m p l e )
, 1 ) ; y r ]+5.4∗10ˆ−5∗ ones ( s i z e ( t , 2 ) , 1 ) , ’−− ’ )
270 x l a b e l ( ’ t ime ( s ) ’ )
271 y l a b e l ( ’ Outpu t (mˆ 3 / s ) ’ )
272 t i t l e ( ’ Rea l Outpu t (mˆ 3 / s ) o f sys tem wi th / w i t h o u t a t t a c k a round
o p e r a t i n g p o i n t ’ )
273 l e g e n d ( ’ y o u t p u t o f sys tem ’ , ’ y under a t t a c k ’ )
274 g r i d
275
276 f i g u r e ( 6 6 )
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277 p l o t ( t s , yb1 , t s , ybbs , ’−− ’ ) ;
278 x l a b e l ( ’ t ime ( s ) ’ ) ;
279 y l a b e l ( ’ Outpu t (mˆ 3 / s ) ’ ) ;
280 t i t l e ( ’ Outpu t (mˆ 3 / s ) o f sys tem wi th / w i t h o u t a t t a c k w i t h o u t
mesurement n o i s e ’ ) ;
281 l e g e n d ( ’ Outou t (mˆ 3 / s ) o f sys tem b e f o r a t t a c k ’ , ’ Outpu t o f sys tem
(mˆ 3 / s ) unde r a t t a c k ’ ) ;
282
283
284 f i g u r e ( 6 )
285 p l o t ( t s , yb , t s , ybr , ’−− ’ ) ;
286 z1= t r a p z ( t s , yb ) ;
287 z2= t r a p z ( t s , ybr ) ;
288 l e g e n d ( ’ y under s i n e ’ , ’ y unde r random s i g n a l ’ )
289 %%%%%%%%%%Kalman f i l t e r
290 P l a n t = s s ( Ao , [ Bo Bo ] , Co , 0 , ’ inpu tname ’ ,{ ’ u ’ ’w’ } , ’ ou tpu tname ’ , ’ y ’ )
;
291 [ kalmf , L , P ] = kalman ( P l a n t , Q, R) ;
292 %%%%%%%%%%u c o n t r o l l e r b e f o r & a f t e r a t t a c k happens
293 t 5 =0 : t s a m p l e :800− t s a m p l e ;
294 U=[ u ( ( 1 : 8 0 0 / t s a m p l e ) , 1 ) ; uu ]+ dsb ’ ;%%%%%%%%%u o u t p u t o f c o n t r o l l e r
i n whole o f t h e t ime + s i n wave
295 y x h a t = l s i m ( kalmf , [ U ybbb ] , t s ) ;
296 y h a t = y x h a t ( : , 1 : s i z e ( Co , 1 ) ) ;
297 x h a t = y x h a t ( : , s i z e ( Co , 1 ) +1: end ) ;
298 [ yoo , ˜ , xoo ]= l s i m ( syso , ( U+w’ ) , t s , 0 ) ; %%%%%s t a t e o f t h e p l a n t i n
t h e whole o f t h e t ime
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299 %ey=ybbb−y h a t ;
300 ey=ybbb−y h a t ;
301 ex=xoo−x h a t ;
302 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%f i g u r e s
303 f i g u r e ( 2 1 )
304 s u b p l o t ( 2 , 2 , [ 1 2 ] ) ;
305 p l o t ( t , ybbs ( : , 1 ) , ’ b ’ ) ;
306 ho ld on ;
307 p l o t ( t , y h a t ( : , 1 ) , ’ r ’ ) ;
308 x l a b e l ( ’ t ’ ) ;
309 y l a b e l ( ’ y ’ ) ;
310 l e g e n d ( ’ Fake o u t p u t r e c e i v e d by c o n t r o l l e r ’ , ’ E s t i m a t e d ’ ) ;
311
312 s u b p l o t ( 2 , 2 , 3 ) ;
313 p l o t ( t , ey ( : , 1 ) ) ;
314 x l a b e l ( ’ t ’ ) ;
315 y l a b e l ( ’ e y ’ ) ;
316
317 s u b p l o t ( 2 , 2 , 4 ) ;
318 h i s t f i t ( ey ( : , 1 ) , 1 0 0 ) ;
319 y l a b e l ( ’ His togram ’ ) ;
320
321 f i g u r e ( 2 2 )
322 s u b p l o t ( 2 , 2 , [ 1 2 ] ) ;
323 p l o t ( t , xoo ( : , 1 ) , ’ b ’ ) ;
324 ho ld on ;
325 p l o t ( t , x h a t ( : , 1 ) , ’ r ’ ) ;
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326 x l a b e l ( ’ t ’ ) ;
327 y l a b e l ( ’ x ’ ) ;
328 l e g e n d ( ’ A c t u a l ’ , ’ E s t i m a t e d ’ ) ;
329
330 s u b p l o t ( 2 , 2 , 3 ) ;
331 p l o t ( t , ex ( : , 1 ) ) ;
332 x l a b e l ( ’ t ’ ) ;
333 y l a b e l ( ’ e x ’ ) ;
334
335 s u b p l o t ( 2 , 2 , 4 ) ;
336 h i s t f i t ( ex ( : , 1 ) , 1 0 0 ) ;
337 y l a b e l ( ’ His togram ’ ) ;
338 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%Per iodogram of t h e F i r s t I n t e r v a l
339 ya=ya−mean ( ya ) ;
340 yb=yb−mean ( yb ) ;
341 ybbb=ybbb−mean ( ybbb ) ;
342 f low =0.1∗ f1 ;
343 fup =1 .5∗ f2 ;
344 nf =1000;
345 f s t e p =( fup−f low ) / n f ;
346 f = f low : f s t e p : fup ;
347 %
348 f i g u r e ( 7 )
349 [ pxxa , f a ]= pe r iodog ram ( ya ( 1 : ( n t 1 ) ) , [ ] , f , f s ) ;
350 p l o t ( f a ∗2∗ pi , pxxa ) ; ho ld on ;
351 x l a b e l ( ’ r a d / s ’ )
352 y l a b e l ( ’PSD ’ )
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353 t i t l e ({ ’ Pe r iodogram of o u t p u t f o r t h e f i r s t i n t e r v a l ’ , ’w1= 0 . 0 1 ,w2
=0.03 r a d / s , w i t h o u t phase ’ } ) ;
354 [ pxxb , fb ]= pe r iodog ram ( yb ( 1 : ( n t 1 ) ) , [ ] , f , f s ) ;
355 p l o t ( fb ∗2∗ pi , pxxb )
356 g r i d
357 l e g e n d ( ’ Pe r iodogram w i t h o u t p h a s i n g ’ , ’ Pe r iodogram wi th p h a s i n g ’ )
358 z= t r a p z ( fa , pxxa ) ;
359
360 f i g u r e ( 8 )
361 [ pxxb , fb ]= pe r iodog ram ( yb ( 1 : ( n t 1 ) ) , [ ] , f , f s ) ;
362 p l o t ( fb ∗2∗ pi , pxxb )
363 x l a b e l ( ’ r a d / s ’ )
364 y l a b e l ( ’PSD ’ )
365 t i t l e ({ ’ Pe r iodogram of o u t p u t f o r t h e f i r s t i n t e r v a l ’ , ’w1= 0 . 0 1 ,w2
=0.03 r a d / s , w i th phase ’ } )
366 g r i d
367 s e t ( gcf , ’ P a p e r P o s i t i o n M o d e ’ , ’ a u t o ’ ) ;
368 s a v e a s ( gcf , ’ t e s t . pdf ’ ) ;
369 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%Per iodogram of t h e Second I n t e r v a l
370 f low1 =0.1∗ f3 ;
371 fup1 =1 .5∗ f4 ;
372 nf =1000;
373 f s t e p 1 =( fup1−f low1 ) / n f ;
374 f11 = f low1 : f s t e p 1 : fup1 ;
375 %
376 f i g u r e ( 9 )
377 [ pxxaa , f a a ]= pe r iodog ram ( ya ( n t 1 : ( n t 1 + n t 2 ) ) , [ ] , f11 , f s ) ;
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378 p l o t ( f a a ∗2∗ pi , pxxaa )
379 x l a b e l ( ’ r a d / s ’ )
380 y l a b e l ( ’PSD ’ )
381 t i t l e ({ ’ Pe r iodogram of o u t p u t w i t h o u t phase f o r t h e second
i n t e r v a l ’ , ’w3= 0 . 0 7 ,w4=0.11 r a d / s ’ } )
382 g r i d
383
384 f i g u r e ( 1 0 )
385 [ pxxbb , fbb ]= pe r iodog ram ( yb ( n t 1 : ( n t 1 + n t 2 ) ) , [ ] , f11 , f s ) ;
386 p l o t ( fbb ∗2∗ pi , pxxbb ) ; ho ld on ;
387 p l o t ( f a a ∗2∗ pi , pxxaa )
388 x l a b e l ( ’ r a d / s ’ )
389 y l a b e l ( ’PSD ’ )
390 t i t l e ({ ’ Pe r iodogram of o u t p u t w i th phase f o r t h e second i n t e r v a l ’
, ’w3= 0 . 0 7 ,w4=0.11 r a d / s ’ } )
391 g r i d
392 zz= t r a p z ( fbb , pxxbb ) ;
393 l e g e n d ( ’ w i th phase ’ , ’ w i t h o u t phase ’ ) ;
394 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%Per iodogram of t h e T h i r d I n t e r v a l
395 f low2 =0.1∗ f5 ;
396 fup2 =1 .5∗ f6 ;
397 nf =1000;
398 f s t e p 2 =( fup2−f low2 ) / n f ;
399 f111 = f low2 : f s t e p 2 : fup2 ;
400 [ pxxaaa , f a a a ]= pe r iodog ram ( ya ( ( n t 1 + n t 2 ) : ( n t 1 + n t 2 + n t 3 ) ) , [ ] , f111 , f s )
;
401 f i g u r e ( 1 1 )
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402 p l o t ( f a a a ∗2∗ pi , pxxaaa ) ;
403 x l a b e l ( ’ r a d / s ’ )
404 y l a b e l ( ’PSD ’ )
405 t i t l e ({ ’ Pe r iodogram of o u t p u t w i t h o u t phase f o r t h e t h i r d
i n t e r v a l ’ , ’w5 = 0 . 2 , w6=0 .6 r a d / s ’ } )
406 g r i d
407 zzz = t r a p z ( f aaa , pxxaaa ) ;
408 f i g u r e ( 1 2 )
409 [ pxxbbb , fbbb ]= pe r iodog ram ( yb ( ( n t 1 + n t 2 ) : ( n t 1 + n t 2 + n t 3 ) ) , [ ] , f111 , f s )
;
410 p l o t ( fbbb ∗2∗ pi , pxxbbb ) ; ho ld on ;
411 p l o t ( f a a a ∗2∗ pi , pxxaaa ) ;
412 x l a b e l ( ’ r a d / s ’ )
413 y l a b e l ( ’PSD ’ )
414 t i t l e ({ ’ Pe r iodogram of o u t p u t w i th and w i t h o u t phase f o r t h e
t h i r d i n t e r v a l ’ , ’w5 = 0 . 2 , w6=0 .6 r a d / s ’ } )
415 g r i d
416 l e g e n d ( ’ w i th phase ’ , ’ w i t h o u t phase ’ ) ;
417
418 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%Attack , Pe r iodogram of t h e F i r s t I n t e r v a l
419 f low3 =0.1∗ f1 ;
420 fup3 =1 .5∗ f6 ;
421 nf =1000;
422 f s t e p 3 =( fup3−f low3 ) / n f ;
423 f3 = f low3 : f s t e p 3 : fup3 ;
424 f i g u r e ( 1 3 )
425 [ pxxa t , f a t ]= pe r iodog ram ( ya ( 4 0 0 0 0 : ( n t 1 / 2 ) ) , [ ] , f3 , f s ) ;
106
426 p l o t ( f a t ∗2∗ pi , p x x a t )
427 x l a b e l ( ’ r a d / s ’ )
428 y l a b e l ( ’PSD ’ )
429 t i t l e ({ ’ Pe r iodogram of o u t p u t from t =400 ’ , ’ t i l l t h e combined
p e r i o d f o r t h e f i r s t i n t e r v a l ’ } )
430 g r i d
431
432 f i g u r e ( 1 4 )
433 [ pxxbt , f b t ]= pe r iodog ram ( ya ( 6 0 0 0 0 : ( n t 1 + n t 2 / 2 ) ) , [ ] , f3 , f s ) ;
434 p l o t ( f b t ∗2∗ pi , pxxb t )
435 x l a b e l ( ’ r a d / s ’ )
436 y l a b e l ( ’PSD ’ )
437 t i t l e ({ ’ Pe r iodogram of o u t p u t when t h e t ime i s from t =600 ’ , ’ t i l l
2∗ combined p e r i o d o f t h e f i r s t i n t e r v a l + t h e combined p e r i o d o f
t h e second i n t e r v a l ’ } )
438 g r i d
439
440 f i g u r e ( 1 5 )
441 [ pxxaa t , f a a t ]= pe r iodog ram ( yb ( 1 : ( n t 5 ) ) , [ ] , f3 , f s ) ;
442 p l o t ( f a a t ∗2∗ pi , p x x a a t )
443 x l a b e l ( ’ r a d / s ’ )
444 y l a b e l ( ’PSD ’ )
445 t i t l e ({ ’ Pe r iodogram of o u t p u t i n ’ , ’ d u r a t i o n o f do ub l e p e r i o d i n
each i n t e r v a l ’ } )
446 g r i d
447 zzz = t r a p z ( f a a t , p x x a a t ) ;
448
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449 f i g u r e ( 1 6 )
450 [ pxxbbt , f b b t ]= pe r iodog ram ( yb ( 2 0 0 0 0 : 0 . 6 ∗ ( n t 5 ) ) , [ ] , f3 , f s ) ;
451 p l o t ( f b b t ∗2∗ pi , pxxbb t )
452 x l a b e l ( ’ r a d / s ’ )
453 y l a b e l ( ’PSD ’ )
454 t i t l e ({ ’ Pe r iodogram of o u t p u t from t =200 s ’ , ’ t i l l 0 . 6 ∗ ( d u r a t i o n o f
do ub l e p e r i o d i n each i n t e r v a l ’ } )
455 g r i d
456
457
458 f i g u r e ( 1 7 )
459 [ pxxbbt , f b b t ]= pe r iodog ram ( yb ( 1 : ( n t 1 ) / 4 ) , [ ] , f , f s ) ;
460 p l o t ( f b b t ∗2∗ pi , pxxbb t )
461 x l a b e l ( ’ r a d / s ’ )
462 y l a b e l ( ’PSD ’ )
463 t i t l e ({ ’ Pe r iodogram of o u t p u t from t =0 ’ , ’ t i l l h a l f t h e f i r s t
combined p e r i o d ’ } )
464 g r i d
465 %%%%%%%%%C o n f i d e n c e Per iodogram i n t h e f i r s t i n t e r v a l o f yb
466 f i g u r e ( 1 9 )
467 [ pxx1 , f8 , pxxc1 ]= pe r iodog ram ( yb ( 1 : ( n t 1 ) ) , r e c t w i n ( n t 1 ) , l e n g t h ( yb ( 1 :
n t 1 ) ) , f s , ’ C o n f i d e n c e L e v e l ’ , 0 . 9 5 ) ;
468 p l o t ( f8 ∗2∗ pi , 1 0∗ l og10 ( pxx1 ) ) ; ho ld on ;
469 p l o t ( f8 ∗2∗ pi , 1 0∗ l og10 ( pxxc1 ) , ’ r−−’ , ’ l i n e w i d t h ’ , 2 ) ; ho ld on ;
470 k1= f l o o r ( max (10∗ l og10 ( pxx1 ) ) ) ∗ ones ( 1 , l e n g t h ( f8 ) ) ;
471 p l o t ( f8 ∗2∗ pi , k1 )
472 a x i s ( [ 0 1 min ( min (10∗ l og10 ( pxxc1 ) ) ) max ( max (10∗ l og10 ( pxxc1 ) ) ) ] ) ;
108
473 x l a b e l ( ’ r a d / s ’ )
474 y l a b e l ( ’dB PSD ’ )
475 t i t l e ({ ’ Pe r iodogram wi th 0 . 9 5 c o n f i d e n c e bound f o r t h e f i r s t
i n t e r v a l i n dou b l e o f combined p e r i o d f o r y ’ } ) ;
476 g r i d
477 l e g e n d ( ’ Pe r idogram ’ , ’ uppe r l i m i t ’ , ’ l ower l i m i t ’ , ’ t h e f i r s t
t h e r e s h o l d ’ ) ;
478 g r i d
479 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% C o n f i d e n c e Per iodogram of t h e second i n t e r v a l
o f yb
480 f i g u r e ( 2 5 )
481 [ pxx5 , f12 , pxxc5 ]= pe r iodog ram ( yb ( n t 1 : n t 1 + n t 2 ) , r e c t w i n ( n t 2 +1) ,
l e n g t h ( yb ( n t 1 : ( n t 1 + n t 2 ) ) ) , f s , ’ C o n f i d e n c e L e v e l ’ , 0 . 9 5 ) ;
482 p l o t ( f12 ∗2∗ pi , 1 0∗ l og10 ( pxx5 ) ) ; ho ld on ;
483 p l o t ( f12 ∗2∗ pi , 1 0∗ l og10 ( pxxc5 ) , ’ r−−’ , ’ l i n e w i d t h ’ , 2 ) ; ho ld on ;
484 k7= f l o o r ( max (10∗ l og10 ( pxx5 ) ) ) ∗ ones ( 1 , l e n g t h ( f12 ) ) ;
485 p l o t ( f12 ∗2∗ pi , k7 )
486 a x i s ( [ 0 1 min ( min (10∗ l og10 ( pxxc5 ) ) ) max ( max (10∗ l og10 ( pxxc5 ) ) ) ] ) ;
487 x l a b e l ( ’ r a d / s ’ )
488 y l a b e l ( ’dB PSD ’ )
489 t i t l e ({ ’ Pe r iodogram wi th 0 . 9 5 c o n f i d e n c e bound f o r t h e second
i n t e r v a l i n dou b l e o f combined p e r i o d f o r y ’ } ) ;
490 g r i d
491 l e g e n d ( ’ Pe r idogram ’ , ’ uppe r l i m i t ’ , ’ l ower l i m i t ’ , ’ t h e socond
t h e r e s h o l d ’ )
492 g r i d
493
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494 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%C o n f i d e n c e Per iodogram of t h e t h i r d i n t e r v a l
o f yb
495 f i g u r e ( 2 6 )
496 [ pxx6 , f13 , pxxc6 ]= pe r iodog ram ( yb ( n t 1 + n t 2 : n t 1 + n t 2 + n t 3 ) , r e c t w i n ( n t 3
+1) , l e n g t h ( yb ( ( n t 1 + n t 2 ) : ( n t 1 + n t 2 + n t 3 ) ) ) , f s , ’ C o n f i d e n c e L e v e l ’
, 0 . 9 5 ) ;
497 p l o t ( f13 ∗2∗ pi , 1 0∗ l og10 ( pxx6 ) ) ; ho ld on ;
498 p l o t ( f13 ∗2∗ pi , 1 0∗ l og10 ( pxxc6 ) , ’ r−−’ , ’ l i n e w i d t h ’ , 2 ) ; ho ld on ;
499 k8= f l o o r ( max (10∗ l og10 ( pxx6 ) ) ) ∗ ones ( 1 , l e n g t h ( f13 ) ) ;
500 p l o t ( f13 ∗2∗ pi , k8 )
501 a x i s ( [ 0 1 min ( min (10∗ l og10 ( pxxc6 ) ) ) max ( max (10∗ l og10 ( pxxc6 ) ) ) ] ) ;
502 x l a b e l ( ’ r a d / s ’ )
503 y l a b e l ( ’dB PSD ’ )
504 t i t l e ({ ’ Pe r iodogram wi th 0 . 9 5 c o n f i d e n c e bound f o r t h e t h i r d
i n t e r v a l i n dou b l e o f combined p e r i o d f o r y ’ } ) ;
505 g r i d
506 l e g e n d ( ’ Pe r idogram ’ , ’ uppe r l i m i t ’ , ’ l ower l i m i t ’ , ’ t h e t h i r d
t h e r e s h o l d ’ )
507 g r i d
508 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%C o n f i d e n c e Per iodogram of t o t a l yb
509 f i g u r e ( 1 8 )
510 [ pxx , f7 , pxxc ]= pe r iodog ram ( yb ( 1 : ( n t 4 ) ) , r e c t w i n ( l e n g t h ( ybbs ) ) ,
l e n g t h ( ybbs ) , f s , ’ C o n f i d e n c e L e v e l ’ , 0 . 9 5 ) ;
511 p l o t ( f7 ∗2∗ pi , 1 0∗ l og10 ( pxx ) ) ; ho ld on ;
512 p l o t ( f7 ∗2∗ pi , 1 0∗ l og10 ( pxxc ) , ’ r−−’ , ’ l i n e w i d t h ’ , 2 ) ; ho ld on ;
513 k2= f l o o r ( max (10∗ l og10 ( pxx1 ) ) ) ∗ ones ( 1 , l e n g t h ( f7 ) ) ;
514 k3= f l o o r ( max (10∗ l og10 ( pxx5 ) ) ) ∗ ones ( 1 , l e n g t h ( f7 ) ) ;
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515 k4= f l o o r ( max (10∗ l og10 ( pxx6 ) ) ) ∗ ones ( 1 , l e n g t h ( f7 ) ) ;
516 p l o t ( f7 ∗2∗ pi , k2 ) ; ho ld on ;
517 p l o t ( f7 ∗2∗ pi , k3 ) ; ho ld on ;
518 p l o t ( f7 ∗2∗ pi , k4 ) ; ho ld on ;
519 a x i s ( [ 0 1 −190 −110]) ;
520 x l a b e l ( ’ r a d / s ’ )
521 y l a b e l ( ’dB PSD ’ )
522 t i t l e ({ ’ Pe r iodogram wi th 0 . 9 5 c o n f i d e n c e bound of t o t a l y ’ } ) ;
523 g r i d
524 l e g e n d ( ’ Pe r idogram ’ , ’ uppe r l i m i t ’ , ’ l ower l i m i t ’ , ’ t h e f i r s t
t h e r e s h o l d ’ , ’ t h e socond t h e r e s h o l d ’ , ’ t h e t h i r d t h e r e s h o l d ’ )
525 g r i d
526 zzzz = t r a p z ( f7 , pxx ) ;
527 %%%%%%%%%%%C o n f i d e n t i a l l e v e l f o r a t t a c k
528 f i g u r e ( 2 0 )
529 [ pxx2 , f9 , pxxc2 ]= pe r iodog ram ( ybbb ( 4 0 0 0 0 : ( n t 1 / 2 ) ) , r e c t w i n ( n t 1
/2−40000) , l e n g t h ( ybbb ( 4 0 0 0 0 : ( n t 1 / 2 ) ) ) , f s , ’ C o n f i d e n c e L e v e l ’
, 0 . 9 5 ) ;
530 p l o t ( f9 ∗2∗ pi , 1 0∗ l og10 ( pxx2 ) ) ; ho ld on ;
531 p l o t ( f9 ∗2∗ pi , 1 0∗ l og10 ( pxxc2 ) , ’ r−−’ , ’ l i n e w i d t h ’ , 2 ) ; ho ld on ;
532 a x i s ( [ 0 1 min ( min (10∗ l og10 ( pxxc2 ) ) ) max ( max (10∗ l og10 ( pxxc2 ) ) ) ] ) ;
533 x l a b e l ( ’ r a d / s ’ )
534 y l a b e l ( ’dB PSD ’ )
535 t i t l e ({ ’ Pe r iodogram wi th 0 . 9 5 c o n f i d e n c e bound f o r o u t p u t unde r
a t t a c k s i n c e t =400 s t i l l 628 s ’ } ) ;
536 l e g e n d ( ’ Pe r idogram ’ , ’ uppe r l i m i t ’ , ’ l ower l i m i t ’ , ’ t h e f i r s t
t h e r e s h o l d ’ , ’ t h e socond t h e r e s h o l d ’ , ’ t h e t h i r d t h e r e s h o l d ’ )
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537 g r i d
538 %%%%%%%%%%%C o n f i d e n t i a l l e v e l f o r a t t a c k
539 f i g u r e ( 2 7 )
540 [ pxx7 , f14 , pxxc7 ]= pe r iodog ram ( ybbb ( 2 0 0 0 0 : 0 . 6 ∗ ( n t 5 ) ) , r e c t w i n ( 0 . 6 ∗ (
n t 5 ) −20000) , l e n g t h ( yb ( 2 0 0 0 0 : 0 . 6 ∗ ( n t 5 ) ) ) , f s , ’ C o n f i d e n c e L e v e l ’
, 0 . 9 5 ) ;
541 p l o t ( f14 ∗2∗ pi , 1 0∗ l og10 ( pxx7 ) ) ; ho ld on ;
542 p l o t ( f14 ∗2∗ pi , 1 0∗ l og10 ( pxxc7 ) , ’ r−−’ , ’ l i n e w i d t h ’ , 2 ) ; ho ld on ;
543 a x i s ( [ 0 1 min ( min (10∗ l og10 ( pxxc7 ) ) ) max ( max (10∗ l og10 ( pxxc7 ) ) ) ] ) ;
544 x l a b e l ( ’ r a d / s ’ )
545 y l a b e l ( ’dB PSD ’ )
546 t i t l e ({ ’ Pe r iodogram wi th 0 . 9 5 c o n f i d e n c e bound f o r o u t p u t unde r
a t t a c k s i n c e t =200 s t i l l 1113 s ’ } ) ;
547
548 %%%%%%%%%%%%%C o n f i d e n c e l e v e l o f p r t i o d o g r a m of t h e f i r s t
i n t e r v a l o f y
549 %%%%%%%%%%%%%a t t a c k
550
551 f i g u r e ( 2 8 )
552 [ pxx8 , f15 , pxxc8 ]= pe r iodog ram ( ybbb ( 1 : n t 1 ) , r e c t w i n ( n t 1 ) , l e n g t h ( yb
( 1 : n t 1 ) ) , f s , ’ C o n f i d e n c e L e v e l ’ , 0 . 9 5 ) ;
553 p l o t ( f15 ∗2∗ pi , 1 0∗ l og10 ( pxx8 ) ) ; ho ld on ;
554 p l o t ( f15 ∗2∗ pi , 1 0∗ l og10 ( pxxc8 ) , ’ r−−’ , ’ l i n e w i d t h ’ , 2 ) ; ho ld on ;
555 k9= f l o o r ( max (10∗ l og10 ( pxx1 ) ) ) ∗ ones ( 1 , l e n g t h ( f15 ) ) ;
556 p l o t ( f15 ∗2∗ pi , k9 )
557 a x i s ( [ 0 1 min ( min (10∗ l og10 ( pxxc8 ) ) ) max ( max (10∗ l og10 ( pxxc8 ) ) ) ] ) ;
558 x l a b e l ( ’ r a d / s ’ )
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559 y l a b e l ( ’dB PSD ’ )
560 t i t l e ({ ’ Pe r iodogram wi th 0 . 9 5 c o n f i d e n c e bound f o r t h e f i r s t
i n t e r v a l i n dou b l e o f combined p e r i o d f o r o u t p u t unde r a t t a c k ’
} ) ;
561 g r i d
562 l e g e n d ( ’ Pe r idogram ’ , ’ uppe r l i m i t ’ , ’ l ower l i m i t ’ , ’ t h e f i r s t
t h e r e s h o l d ’ ) ;
563 g r i d
564 %%%%%%%%%C o n f i d e n c e Per iodogram i n t h e second i n t e r v a l o f y
a t t a c k
565 f i g u r e ( 2 3 )
566 [ pxx3 , f10 , pxxc3 ]= pe r iodog ram ( ybbb ( n t 1 : ( n t 1 + n t 2 ) ) , r e c t w i n ( n t 2 +1) ,
l e n g t h ( ybbb ( n t 1 : ( n t 1 + n t 2 ) ) ) , f s , ’ C o n f i d e n c e L e v e l ’ , 0 . 9 5 ) ;
567 p l o t ( f10 ∗2∗ pi , 1 0∗ l og10 ( pxx3 ) ) ; ho ld on ;
568 p l o t ( f10 ∗2∗ pi , 1 0∗ l og10 ( pxxc3 ) , ’ r−−’ , ’ l i n e w i d t h ’ , 2 ) ; ho ld on ;
569 k5= f l o o r ( max (10∗ l og10 ( pxx5 ) ) ) ∗ ones ( 1 , l e n g t h ( f10 ) ) ;
570 p l o t ( f10 ∗2∗ pi , k5 )
571 a x i s ( [ 0 1 min ( min (10∗ l og10 ( pxxc3 ) ) ) max ( max (10∗ l og10 ( pxxc3 ) ) ) ] ) ;
572 x l a b e l ( ’ r a d / s ’ )
573 y l a b e l ( ’dB PSD ’ )
574 t i t l e ({ ’ Pe r iodogram wi th 0 . 9 5 c o n f i d e n c e bound f o r t h e second
i n t e r v a l i n dou b l e o f combined p e r i o d f o r o u t p u t unde r a t t a c k ’
} ) ;
575 g r i d
576 l e g e n d ( ’ Pe r idogram ’ , ’ uppe r l i m i t ’ , ’ l ower l i m i t ’ , ’ t h e socond
t h e r e s h o l d ’ )
577 g r i d
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578 %%%%%%%%%C o n f i d e n c e Per iodogram i n t h e t h i r d i n t e r v a l
579 f i g u r e ( 2 4 )
580 [ pxx4 , f11 , pxxc4 ]= pe r iodog ram ( ybbb ( n t 1 + n t 2 : ( n t 1 + n t 2 + n t 3 ) ) , r e c t w i n (
n t 3 +1) , l e n g t h ( ybbb ( n t 1 + n t 2 : n t 1 + n t 2 + n t 3 ) ) , f s , ’ C o n f i d e n c e L e v e l ’
, 0 . 9 5 ) ;
581 p l o t ( f11 ∗2∗ pi , 1 0∗ l og10 ( pxx4 ) ) ; ho ld on ;
582 p l o t ( f11 ∗2∗ pi , 1 0∗ l og10 ( pxxc4 ) , ’ r−−’ , ’ l i n e w i d t h ’ , 2 ) ; ho ld on ;
583 k6= f l o o r ( max (10∗ l og10 ( pxx6 ) ) ) ∗ ones ( 1 , l e n g t h ( f11 ) ) ;
584 p l o t ( f11 ∗2∗ pi , k6 )
585 a x i s ( [ 0 1 min ( min (10∗ l og10 ( pxxc4 ) ) ) max ( max (10∗ l og10 ( pxxc4 ) ) ) ] ) ;
586 x l a b e l ( ’ r a d / s ’ )
587 y l a b e l ( ’dB PSD ’ )
588 t i t l e ({ ’ Pe r iodogram wi th 0 . 9 5 c o n f i d e n c e bound f o r t h e t h i r d
i n t e r v a l i n dou b l e o f combined p e r i o d f o r o u t p u t unde r a t t a c k ’
} ) ;
589 g r i d
590 l e g e n d ( ’ Pe r idogram ’ , ’ uppe r l i m i t ’ , ’ l ower l i m i t ’ , ’ t h e t h i r d
t h e r e s h o l d ’ )
591 g r i d
592 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%C o n f i d e n c e pe r iodog ram of y under a t t a c k i n whole
p e r i o d
593 f i g u r e ( 2 9 )
594 [ pxx9 , f16 , pxxc9 ]= pe r iodog ram ( ybbb ( 1 : n t 5 ) , r e c t w i n ( n t 5 ) , l e n g t h ( yb
( 1 : n t 5 ) ) , f s , ’ C o n f i d e n c e L e v e l ’ , 0 . 9 5 ) ;
595 p l o t ( f16 ∗2∗ pi , 1 0∗ l og10 ( pxx9 ) ) ; ho ld on ;
596 p l o t ( f16 ∗2∗ pi , 1 0∗ l og10 ( pxxc9 ) , ’ r−−’ , ’ l i n e w i d t h ’ , 2 ) ; ho ld on ;
597 k2= f l o o r ( max (10∗ l og10 ( pxx1 ) ) ) ∗ ones ( 1 , l e n g t h ( f16 ) ) ;
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598 k3= f l o o r ( max (10∗ l og10 ( pxx5 ) ) ) ∗ ones ( 1 , l e n g t h ( f16 ) ) ;
599 k4= f l o o r ( max (10∗ l og10 ( pxx6 ) ) ) ∗ ones ( 1 , l e n g t h ( f16 ) ) ;
600 p l o t ( f16 ∗2∗ pi , k2 ) ; ho ld on ;
601 p l o t ( f16 ∗2∗ pi , k3 ) ; ho ld on ;
602 p l o t ( f16 ∗2∗ pi , k4 ) ; ho ld on ;
603 p l o t ( f12 ∗2∗ pi , k7 )
604 a x i s ( [ 0 1 −200 −100]) ;
605 x l a b e l ( ’ r a d / s ’ )
606 y l a b e l ( ’dB PSD ’ )
607 t i t l e ({ ’ Pe r iodogram wi th 0 . 9 5 c o n f i d e n c e bound f o r t h e whole o f
do ub l e o f combined p e r i o d f o r o u t p u t unde r a t t a c k ’ } ) ;
608 g r i d
609 l e g e n d ( ’ Pe r idogram ’ , ’ uppe r l i m i t ’ , ’ l ower l i m i t ’ , ’ t h e f i r s t
t h e r e s h o l d ’ , ’ t h e socond t h e r e s h o l d ’ , ’ t h e t h i r d t h e r e s h o l d ’ )
610 g r i d
611 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%pburg pe r iodog ram
612 f i g u r e ( 3 0 )
613 morder = 1 2 ;
614 ws=2∗ p i ∗ f s ;
615 pburg ( yb , morder , [ ] , f s )
616 %pburg ( yb , morder , 1 0 2 4 , ws )
617 %pburg ( yb , morder , l e n g t h ( yb ) )
618 [ px , f f ]= pburg ( yb , morder , [ ] , f s )
619 % [ , pxxc ] = pburg ( yb , morder , , ’ Conf idenceLeve l ’ , 1 )
620 p l o t (2∗ p i ∗ f f , 1 0∗ l og10 ( px ) )
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